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INTRODUCTION

This Article is about the inconsistency in the federal treatment of stranded costs in two of the country's main energy industries, natural gas and electricity. Stranded costs are costs
that regulated firms cannot recover without government help after their markets are deregulated. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has treated those costs differently in
its two major deregulations.
Natural gas deregulation was largely FERC's brainchild.
FERC took the changes Congress made when it deregulated the
wellhead gas market and built on that foundation to thoroughly
restructure the natural gas business. Beginning in 1984, the
Commission voided the minimum bills pipelines had used to
make customers pay even when they did not buy gas;1 imposed
open-access requirements that made pipelines open their mainlines to competing gas merchants;2 and, finally, unbundled gas
services so that pipelines have to offer each part of delivering
natural gas, from sales to gathering, from transportation to storage, on an unbundled, stand-alone basis. 3 Each reform re-

1. Order No. 380, Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Pipeline
Minimum Commodity Bill Provisions, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778 (1984) (subsequent history
omitted).
2. Order No. 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985) (subsequent history omitted) [hereinafter Order No.
436].
3. Order No. 636, Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation; and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After
Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (1992) (subsequent history omitted)
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sponded to a specific anti-competitive practice common to many
pipelines. The net economic result of FERC's remedies to date
has been to reduce the wellhead price for gas (a lot),4 to lure

many competitors into gas sales
and field services, but also to
5
foster increased concentration.

One of the core problems of natural gas deregulation is the
stranded costs issue. Any deregulation that correctly assumes

that competitive firms can undercut the costs and prices of incumbent firms will leave regulated companies with some

stranded costs. If it does not, it is time to question the wisdom
of the deregulation in the first place. 6 Perhaps the most urgent

[hereinafter Order No. 636].
4. One of the first serious efforts to track the economic effect of gas deregulation is
in ROBERT CRANDALL & JERRY ELLIG, ECONOMIC DEREGULATION AND CUSTOMER CHOICE:
LESSONS FOR THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY (1997). Crandall and Ellig report that gas prices fell
for all classes of customers; that the transportation margin has fallen 37% in the decade
after Order No. 380 was issued; but that distribution margins have not reacted. Id. at
10-12. Though Crandall and Ellig admit the "surprising[ ]... paucity of economic studies that tries to separate the effect of regulatory reform from other factors influencing
gas prices," they do point to two factors that suggest increasing competitiveness. Id. at
12. One is that gas prices have begun to move together, as one would expect in a truly
competitive market. Id. The other is that total industry revenues have fallen even
though consumption has risen in the last decade. Id. at 17.
5. The pace of change in the now-linked gas and electricity industries has become so
rapid that it is almost impossible to remain current. For one of the latest summaries of
merger activities within and between these industries, which some now like to gloss together as the "BTU convergence" market, see BTU Convergence Action Gathering Momentum, OIL & GAS J., Mar. 24, 1997, at 27. The number of mergers in the electric industry was greatest between 1917 and 1930, and this period of consolidation was
followed by the spin-off of over 750 utilities from holding companies between 1935 and
1950. EIA, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY: AN UPDATE 89
(1996) [hereinafter EIA UPDATE]. As concentration resumes, of course, each new merger
is a greater contributor at the margin to the decline in competition. Moreover, a number
of recent mergers have been between quite large companies. Id. For a chart of mergers
between 1986 and 1995, see id. at 90-91.
6. Deregulation still might be justified if regulated companies are just as efficient as
unregulated counterparts today, but competition would produce greater innovation going
forward. See, eg., Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law as Industrial Policy: Should Judges and
JuriesMake it?, in ANTrRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPTrIvENass 29, 31 (Thomas Jorde &
David Teece eds., 1992) ("At least since Schumpeter wrote nearly fifty years ago, innovation has been thought to contribute far more to our well-being than keeping prices closer
to costs through competition." (citation omitted)); Frank Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND ComPETITIvENESS, supra, at 119, 122 ("An antitrust

policy that reduced prices by five percent today at the expense of reducing by [one] percent the annual rate at which innovation lowers the costs of production would be a calamity!); Thomas Jorde & David Teece, Introduction to ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra, at 4 (We take it as axiomatic that innovation and its rapid and
profitable commercialization are the key factors driving productivity improvement and
economic welfare.").
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reason for deregulating the gas industry and forcing pipelines to
act more competitively was the size of the efficiency gap: pipelines had accumulated very long-term, high-priced take-or-pay
contracts. As competition reduced wellhead prices for unregulated gas and open access let the cheaper gas compete in pipelines' sales markets, pipelines found that they no longer could
sell their contract gas.
Stranded take-or-pay costs posed a test of the Commission's
commitment to competition and to consumer welfare. If pipelines could force their customers to pay for take-or-pay gas anyway, the customers would have no incentive to buy cheaper gas
from more efficient suppliers. The market would not reflect the
gains that competition could bring and consumers would lose
the advantages of deregulation. Real competition
would be
7
delayed until take-or-pay contracts expired.
Conversely, if FERC made pipelines absorb all of these
costs, some might go bankrupt. Their "financial integrity" would
be threatened. Moreover, pipelines complained that they only incurred take-or-pay costs because regulators forced them to maintain substantial gas inventories. Pipelines said that they had
been promised recovery under their "regulatory bargain" or "regulatory compact."
FERC's resolution of the take-or-pay problem is particularly
important because, as the Commission later would say, it had
not previously addressed such industry-wide stranded costs. It
had ruled on the recoverability of many individually bad, even
dumb, investments. At times, as with nuclear plants, very similar mistakes have rippled across one or another of the regulated
energy industries. But never before had the Commission faced
costs stranded so systematically by its own rules, in this instance new rules that had been necessitated by pipelines'
anticompetitiveness.
When FERC voided minimum bills and imposed open access, it gave pipelines no compensation. These categories of loss
fell entirely on pipelines. Then, as take-or-pay costs mounted,
the Commission used Order No. 5008 to make pipelines bear
7. In this sticky world with its transactions costs, competition probably would be
delayed even longer than contract expiration. Customers have an incentive to stick with
pipeline suppliers until their existing contracts run out. This artificial diversion of demand would limit the market for new companies, and fewer competitors would invest in
this market. Some entering companies still might arrive early and offer incentives for
customers to switch. In essence, they would share some of their future gain to subsidize
pipeline stranded costs, but it is unlikely that many companies would display such market courage.
8. Order No. 500, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead De-
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many of those costs, too. The Commission's solution may have
been the most heavily litigated decision it ever has issued.9
FERC's fundamental choice was that pipeline stranded costs
should be allocated according to responsibility for buying the
wrong gas supplies. Because it believed (albeit without explaining why) that all sides in the industry had some blame for unwise gas purchases, the Commission created an equitable sharing mechanism. "[All segments" of the industry, including
pipeline shareholders, paid part of the price. In Order No. 500,
the Commission denied pipeline claims that market-forcing regulations should be treated as the sole cause of stranded costs.
Instead, the key determinants were the uneconomic characteristics of take-or-pay contracts and responsibility for signing those
contracts. The Commission rejected the claim that regulated
companies have a right to compensation just because their
losses are linked to new regulations that increased their exposure to competition. Instead, it pointed to pipelines' responsibility for take-or-pay costs. Not only did these pipeline investments
have to be prudent when made, but in addition, the contracts
had to remain "used and useful." If pipeline supply contracts
could not compete, the government would not step in to help.
The Commission rejected the regulatory bargain argument.
The argument was that pipelines had a right to pass on the
costs of take-or-pay contracts, even though their customers did
not want to buy this gas, because pipelines had signed these onerous contracts in order to fulfill their expectations of continuing
to serve old customers. Yet FERC refused to allow recovery even
if take-or-pay contracts "may have been entered into to meet the
reasonably anticipated needs of the pipeline's customers. 10
The reason for discussing these principles of natural gas
cost-recovery is that the Commission is rejecting these principles in electricity. Today it is electric companies that own outmoded plants and have long-term, overpriced supply contracts. Today it is in electricity that open access has exposed vulnerable
regulatory assets to market competition. Yet in spite of the fact
that it was the utilities who bought these assets, just as it was
pipelines who entered take-or-pay contracts, FERC has decided
control, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987), (subsequent history omitted) [hereinafter Order No.
500].
9. As the Commission said in Order No. 528-A, "it is difficult to imagine what other
issue has generated as much meaningful comment as the take-or-pay issues.! Order No.
528-A, Mechanisms for Passthrough of Pipeline Take-or-Pay Buyout and Buydown Costs,
54 F.E.R.C. T 61,095, at 61,295 (1991) [hereinafter Order 528-A].
10. See id. at 61,304.
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to let utilities pass virtually all of their stranded costs along to
their customers.
In Order Nos. 88811 and 888-A,2 the Commission ignored
blame and responsibility for uneconomic utility plants and supply contracts. Those were the factors that had made pipelines
responsible in natural gas. Instead, Order No. 888 shifts to
three other principles.' 3 One is the regulatory bargain that
FERC now reads to permit recovery of even uneconomic electricity assets. The second is financial integrity, the fear that utilities would suffer unbearable losses if not given government
help. The Commission gave great weight to electric companies'
finances, even though this factor had not prevented it from
making pipelines pay many of their stranded costs. The third
principle is a twisted version of "cost causation," which turns
out to be customers "causing" utilities to want to serve, rather
than utilities causing uneconomic assets to be brought into
service.
None of these factors was relevant in natural gas.
I. EQUITABLE SHARING IN NATURAL GAS: COST RESPONSIBILITY
REQUIRED UTILITIES THAT MADE UNECONOMIC PURCHASES To PAY
HEAVILY FOR THEM
The key natural gas order is Order No. 500. This is the order that allocated take-or-pay losses. In prior orders, FERC had
voided minimum bills and issued its open-access rule without
any direct compensation, and without addressing take-or-pay
costs. The Commission kept trying to put take-or-pay losses
aside; courts kept reversing for some allocation of those losses.
Finally, in Order No. 500, FERC addressed this problem.
Order No. 500 split the responsibility for unnecessary gas
purchases between pipelines and their customers. FERC made
pipelines (and their shareholders) absorb between twenty-five
11. Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by

Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996) [hereinafter Order
,No. 888].
12. Order No. 888-A, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-

Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 62 Fed. Reg. -12,274 (1997) [hereinafter Order

No. 888-A].
13. It may be more correct to say that Order No. 888 uses four main principles to

justify stranded cost recovery. Although the "reasonable expectations' test formally is
part of the recovery mechanism, it also reflects FERC's apparent belief that utilities
should be able to force customers reasonably expected to remain customers to pay any
costs of departure, without regard to the inefficiency of a utility's power.
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percent and fifty percent of high-priced natural gas costs. FERC
would let theni pass an equal amount, from twenty-five percent
to fifty percent, on to their customers through a fixed charge.1 4
Any residual costs (for instance, fifty percent if a pipeline chose
to absorb just twenty-five percent and pass through twenty-five

percent) could be added to the ordinary rate and recouped to the
extent that customers would buy the pipeline's expensive gas. 5
A.

Investment Responsibility for Uneconomic Gas Supplies
Determined the Distributionof Natural Gas Losses

The most important part of Order No. 500 is the principle
the Commission decided should apply in deciding how to allocate take-or-pay losses. The principle was cost responsibility for
bad contracts. Cost responsibility governed cost recoupment. Order No. 500 couched the justification for equitable sharing in the

language of blame:
The causes of the pipelines' take-or-pay problems are many and complex.
It is undoubtedly true that some pipelines independently entered into
contracts incorporating both high prices and high take-or-pay levels. At
the same time, pipelines entered into contracts, which were based on the
anticipated demands of their customers, and whose terms reflected those
which producers were able to obtain under the then prevailing market
conditions ....
The Commission recognizes that it is difficult to assign
blame for the pipeline industrys take-or-pay problems. In brief, no one
segment of the natural gas industry or particular circumstance appears
wholly responsible for the pipelines' excess inventories of gas. As a result, aZl segments should shoulder some of the burden of resolving the
problem.' 6
14. As one would expect, there was a lot of litigation over the structure of this fixed
charge, just as there will be over any parts of electricity costs that are passed along. For
instance, FERC's initial allocation formula, which relied on the pattern of recent
purchases, was invalidated for violating the filed rate doctrine. American Gas Distributors v.FERC, 893 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir 1989). And, of course, the pattern of imposition will
affect just how quickly new competitors can enter the market.
15. A brave pipeline in theory could have ignored the sharing mechanism and tried
to pass one hundred percent of its costs through in its volumetric charge. But pipelines
already had trouble getting customers to buy their expensive gas; given that open access
was making much cheaper gas available in the spot market, full volumetric passthrough was not going to happen and everyone knew it. Pipelines ultimately would seek
equitable-sharing treatment for about forty percent of the gas costs that they had been
unable to resolve with producers. See Order No. 500-H, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 54 Fed. Reg. 52,344, 52,357 (1989) [hereinafter
Order No. 500-H.
16. Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg. at 30,337.
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Unfortunately, FERC adopted its "equitable" formula without explaining why cost responsibility was its watchword, how
much pipelines were to blame, or how it had decided that "all
parties" bore some responsibility for the mess into which pipeline purchasing practices had gotten the industry. Nor did the
Commission decide the inextricably linked question of how much
it and state regulators had distorted pipeline purchasing decisions, for instance, by pressing pipelines to increase their gas
supplies. 17 Had it held prudency hearings on take-or-pay costs,
the Commission would have had to decide how much pipelines
were to "blame" for buying gas that they could not resell without government help. It also should have addressed how much
responsibility, if any, its own prior decisions bore for the industry crisis. But Order No. 500 avoided specific findings of fault
and blame.
FERC was blunt about not allocating responsibility more
specifically:
In formulating the proposed policy, the Commission consciously sought to
avoid, to the extent possible, lengthy and potentially complex hearings
involving an attempt to quantify and ascribe blame for the accumulation
of pipeline take-or-pay liabilities. In the Commission's judgment, the
principal objective should be to design and implement procedures to deal
quickly, effectively, and positively with the take-or-pay problem. To this
end, the Commission proposed a rebuttable presumption that a pipeline's
agreement to assume an equitable share of take-or-pay costs would be
sufficient to take account of any imprudence on the part of that pipeline
in incurring take-or-pay liability.s

Nonetheless, one can see why responsibility for incurring
stranded costs is a fair principle for allocating take-or-pay
losses. One reason is that cost responsibility fits pipelines' duty
to supply gas at "just and reasonable rates." This language gives
pipelines a duty to supply the lowest-cost power.19 Very high
17. For a reading that regulations distorted pipeline decision-making more than
electric utility decisionmaking, see National Regulatory Research Institute, Comments

Related to FERC's Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 6 (Aug. 8, 1995) [hereinafter NRRI Comments] ("In the recent history of the electric industry there [has] not
been any 'berating' of electric utility management to sign wholesale power contracts.")
[All Comments in this Article are cited from Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utili-

ties and Transmitting Utilities, FERC Docket No. RM94-7-000].
18. Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg. at 30,341 (emphasis added); see also id. at 30,342
("The Commission believes it is necessary to expand the proposed mechanism to provide

for sharing of take-or-pay costs through market forces as well as through voluntary
agreement.").
19. FERC has given one version of this duty in Order No. 436, where it said:
What is required is to adapt our regulatory framework to the changed circum-
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priced gas could not fulfill that duty.
Another reason for not compensating pipelines, when they
can only resell their gas at a loss, is that regulation had left gas
purchase decisions to the pipelines. This was an area for the
free play of their management expertise. Though regulated,
pipelines remained private companies. They were supposed to
put their entrepreneurial talents to work. Pipelines selected the
producers, and the regions, from which they drew gas. Pipelines
decided how much capital to invest in affiliate production, and
how much to allocate to market purchases--where to draw the
"make or buy" line in their internal structuring. Pipelines decided as they negotiated their supply contracts which price,
quantity, and force majeure terms were acceptable, and which
they should reject. Holding pipelines to some performance standard for these decisions is fully consistent with any regulatory
bargain.
And, third, cost responsibility is efficient. The efficiency
question is which companies can provide power most cheaply
over the long run. Under this standard, companies that bought
the wrong assets should be disfavored. Their display of bad economic management while regulated is a sign that these companies are unlikely, on average, to be more efficient after
20
deregulation.
In contrast, to the extent that regulators instead are "to
blame" for coercing pipelines into some inefficient purchases,
those costs should be passed along. Such cost differentials do
not indicate relative inefficiency. Companies saddled with regulatory costs may even be more efficient than their competitors:
here the problem is to judge underlying efficiencies after discounting for the effects of the distorting regulations. Some portion of stranded take-or-pay costs are uneconomic not because
pipelines cannot compete, but because regulators could not regulate. This was one reason why it made sense for FERC to shift
some pipeline losses to consumers, whose interests the Commisstances in order to implement our statutory responsibilities in ways that further Congressional goals of the lowest reasonable rate for natural gas customers consistent with reliable, long-term service.
Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. at 42,413.
20. Some of the shortcomings of regulated firms may result from their inability to
master the regulatory environment. This weakness in itself may not predict success or
failure in competitive markets. But very high costs for regulated companies are also
likely, on average, to reflect an inability to control costs and a lack of concern over costs,
factors that can carry over into the deregulated period and that are signs of economic
inefficiency.
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sion supposedly served as it carried out its administrative
duties.
The selection of cost responsibility is the most important aspect of FERC's handling of take-or-pay costs. Another way to understand its significance is to look at stranded costs and deregulation itself in economists' terms of supply and demand.
Traditional American regulation, with its limits on market entry
and proscribed service areas, limits the supply of energy services. By limiting the range of firms from which customers can
draw, it also constrains their effective demand, making customers less able to shift to other companies. And the homogeneity of
services approved under regulatory controls itself stunts the
evolution of customer preferences. Firms face demand that is
more inelastic, or less responsive, than in ordinary markets.
The immediate gas-cost problem in natural gas was a supply problem, not a demand problem. Regulated pipelines were
not offering the least-cost gas supply. In electricity, the deepest
pressures for deregulation stem from the same kind of problem:
the difference between the very high prices for power from some
of our largest utilities, and the lower average cost of new companies, is simply too large. These problems are very different from
expectations about the customer base, which concern the structure of demand in regulated markets. Cost responsibility is an
appropriate principle for stranded costs, because it is the cost21
supply problem that has produced the need for deregulation.
All of these considerations support the natural-gas principle
of making regulated firms absorb a big share of their losses
when they buy the wrong assets.
21. For reflection of the supply nature of the press toward electricity deregulation,
see EIA UPDATE, supra note 5, at 35 ('Ihe main thrust is coming from large industrial
users of electricity who, in some areas of the United States, have been burdened by high
electricity prices while their competitors in other areas pay far less for a kilowatt hour
of electricity ....[LIarge differences in the retail prices of electricity have continued to
motivate some to advocate expanded restructuring"(citation omitted)).
Regulation also distorts demand, particularly over time. As customers grow accustomed to facing a single supplier, they may irrationally under-invest in the time and resources they would spend in competitive markets seeking out suppliers that can best fulfill their needs. Product offerings will tend to be fewer, both within and between
companies; demand more homogenous; and firms will feel less pressure to innovate. Although the dulling of technological advance is, to many economists, the most costly negative effect of regulation, and though it manifests itself in an impoverishment of supply,
regulation is linked intimately to deficiencies in demand as well.
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B. Regulation's Role in Stranding Costs Did Not Entitle
Pipelines to Protection
A second critical aspect of Order No. 500 is its rejection of
arguments that pipelines had a right to dump their losses on
customers under the theory that regulations "caused" take-orpay losses. There is no question but that regulatory changes exposed pipelines to new losses. Regulations created the structure
of competition in which pipelines no longer had government protection for the uneconomic portion of their gas costs. In that
sense, regulation "caused" take-or-pay losses. But that FERC
had a role in making pipelines unable to foist high-priced gas on
their customers, who now had choices, did not create a right to
compensation.
The decision that stranded costs should be allocated by cost
responsibility embodies the determination that the role of government action in creating more exposure to loss did not absolve
pipelines for their responsibility for entering bad contracts.
FERC did not let pipelines hide behind regulation or their "reasonable" expectation of a sheltered customer franchise. The
Commission made this point in Order No. 528-A, an Order that
it later would identify as giving the "fullest justification for [Order No. 500's] absorption requirement."22
At least to ordinary, competent readers of the English language, Order No. 528-A seems to reiterate, and emphasize, the
same themes as Order No. 500. First and foremost, it stood on
the same ground of cost responsibility for uneconomic costs as
the guide to loss imposition. It repeated the decision that equitable sharing is based on the "fundamental principle that all
segments of the industry... should share in the costs of resolving pipeline take-or-pay obligations."2 This allocation rested on
the distribution of blame and responsibility for the now-undesired gas costs: FERC repeated that "no single2 4segment of the
industry is to 'blame' for those transition costs."
22. Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,393.
23. Order No. 528-A, 54 F.E.R.C. at 61,303.
24. Id. FERC did recite two subsidiary principles, but only because it believed they
bolstered, not replaced, investment responsibility. It added that, "[flurthermore, all segments of the industry have benefitted from the transition to a more competitive market7
Id.; see also id. at 61,298 (Commission "is mindful that many have benefitted significantly from the development and maturation of the open-access transportation program"). This suggested that the Commission might impose some costs on parties who
benefitted from transition, even if they were totally free of fault for pipelines' bad investments. The Commission also claimed that its policy emerged from a complex balance of
benefits and burdens: "the Commission must use its expertise to consider, weigh, and
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The Commission told pipelines that it would not protect
them from their inability to compete, even though their losses
existed in part because deregulation had opened the gas market
to competition. Pipelines had argued, as electric companies do
today, that they were entitled to a "reasonable opportunity to
recover all prudently incurred costs." 25 FERC's response was

that this "opportunity" did not shield pipelines from having to
persuade customers to buy their gas. The Commission spoke
bluntly:
[Pipelines] ignore two other equally well-established principles: (1) that
the Commission need not provide pipelines a mechanism for guaranteed
recovery of costs which market conditions would not otherwise permit
them to recover and (2) that current ratepayers should only bear the legitimate costs of providing service to them.2

Returning to the language of supply and demand, pipelines were
responsible for the supply-side problem in their gas contracts.
This was a cost
or other aspects
Even when
supply problem,

issue, not a question of consumer expectations
of demand.
take-or-pay costs are understood properly as a
their Order No. 500 treatment turns on a sub-

balance the relative benefits and burdens on each segment of the industry" Id. at
61,299. This language in turn suggested the Commission might shift costs to avoid a dis-

proportionate impact on any one party.
FERC adjusted Order No. 528-A for 'ability to pay" in another way. Although Order
No. 500 only allowed pipelines to recover, at most, 50% of their costs in a surcharge, the
Commission had raised that ceiling to 75% for "new costs not previously included in an
Order No. 500 filing Id. at 61,300. Its concern was that as customers switched out of
firm gas sales 'to transportation... or leaving the system altogether.., it may not be
practicable for these pipelines... to recover those costs other than through a volumetric
surcharge." Id. In the context of the 'fundamental principle" that everyone was to blame,
this made better sense: the Commission should not allocate a shared responsibility in a
way that penalized only one side in the industry. Id. at 61,303.
25. Id.

26. Id. FERC noted that courts "have consistently held that the Commission need
not protect pipelines from underrecoveries of costs resulting from market conditions."
(citing the Associated Gas Distributors'court that reviewed Order No. 436). Id. In Order
No. 436, pipelines challenged the Commission's power to impose open-access rules without giving pipelines some compensation for their losses. But at least on this point, the
courts upheld the Commission. As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would say:
Despite [the] constraints on the Commission's power to limit pass-through by
decree, it has considerable ability to protect consumers by bringing about market conditions that prevent a pipeline from passing costs forward. The NGPA's
legal limit on restricting pipelines clearly do not bar rules tending to generate
Indeed, that is the principle underlying Order
such market conditions ....
436.
Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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tle distinction about cost responsibility that the Commission has
ignored in electricity. It is true that unrecoverable gas costs existed "because" of regulation. Pipelines could have forced their
customers to buy even extraordinarily expensive gas if pipelines
still had minimum bills and still could prevent competitors from
using interstate pipelines' mainline space. Thus in the most fundamental sense, the regulatory changes designed to expose pipelines to competition-particularly the NGPA and Order Nos. 380
and 436--"caused" the take-or-pay recovery problem.
Regulation thus may have exposed gas supply costs to competition, but this did not exculpate pipelines for their economic
errors. FERC had not prohibited pipelines from trying to get
customers to buy pipeline gas. It just paved the way for other
sellers to compete with the pipelines. The Commission still set
rates that would allow a full recovery of investment, plus a reasonable return, if the pipeline could persuade customers to buy
its gas. It was in this sense that pipelines' having to absorb any
gas costs "results ultimately from conditions in the natural gas
market,.., not Commission decree."27 Pipelines faced losses because they had promised to buy gas that was too expensive to
resell at a profit.
Indeed, in a ruling that helps show how deeply pipeline economic decisions were part of the take-or-pay problem, FERC
gave pipelines the alternative of ignoring equitable sharing and
trying to pass through one hundred percent of their costs in ordinary rates. Pipelines could not, of course, because their gas
costs were too far out of line with market prices. Customers
would buy less if they faced a marginal price that incorporated
the pipelines' pricing miscalculations.
The relative roles of regulation and market errors are best
understood by picturing deregulation and bad pipeline investments as dual, independent (but reinforcing) causes of the takeor-pay predicament. Both are necessary causes, but neither a
sufficient cause, of stranded costs. Deregulation exposed pipelines to competition, and so prevented them from continuing to
shift the cost of overpriced gas onto their customers. At the
same time, the fact that pipelines had uneconomic gas in the
first place (and how much varied from one pipeline to another,
one more sign that the root of the problem lay in the differential
27. Order No. 528-A, 54 F.E.R.C. at 61,303. The Commission went on, fnlonetheless
it is market conditions generally that prevent open access pipelines from recovering a
significant portion of their take-or-pay costs through their commodity sales rates ....
Id.
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efficiency of these privately-owned regulated companies) reflected failure in their own market choices.
C. FinancialIntegrity Concerns Did Not Immunize Pipelines
In natural gas, the Commission denied that pipelines were
entitled to full recovery to protect their financial integrity. The
Commission said that equitable sharing, under which pipelines
paid many costs, allowed it to handle any legitimate concerns
about financial integrity. In electricity, in contrast, FERC has
relied heavily on worries about electric companies' bottom lines.
FERC fully understood that open access might allow pipelines to "recover few, if any, take-or-pay costs through their
commodity sales rates."2 This was why it had created the "alternative mechanism" of equitable sharing. But in the Commission's view this partial protection, under which pipelines still
bore a lot of their losses, allowed pipelines to recover "a sufficiently large percentage of the costs so that their financial viability and ability to provide service to their customers is not
undermined.! 9
D. Even Prudent Costs Would Be Disallowed, If Not Used and
Useful
The Commission rejected claims that regulated companies
have a right to recoup all prudently incurred costs. This is another significant point for electricity deregulation because, in
Order No. 888, FERC pointed to the prudency requirement as
reassurance that the interests of consumers will be protected. 30
And electric companies like to cite language, often dictum, about
the "opportunity to recover all legitimate costs" as if it represents a broader principle (one that in fact 31
does not exist) that
pipelines have an absolute right of recovery.
FERC largely marginalized the prudency issue in Order No.
500 by taking steps to discourage prudency challenges. It admit28. Id. at 61,303-04.
29. Id. at 61,304.
30. See Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,391 (discussing recovery of prudent
costs, assuming that prudent rates will include all 'just and reasonable" costs, and reiterating that prudency of costs already recovered will not be subject to relitigation).
31. The simplest reason that prudency tests cannot be converted into a sufficient
test for the recovery of costs, at least not legitimately, is that assets also have to be used
and useful. There always has been a requirement that regulated firms not shoot so wide
of the mark that their assets not serve the welfare of their customers. For a discussion
of the used and useful standard, see infra note 36.
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ted that it "consciously sought to avoid" the kind of disputes
that characterize ordinary ratebase hearings.3 2 Order No. 500
did not prohibit prudency review of pipeline gas purchasing, but
it did the next best thing. Prudency review would come with a
barely veiled threat to gas consumers. In a prudency hearing,
the pipeline could ask to recover all of its costs. No matter how
much a pipeline previously had volunteered to share equitably,
a prudency hearing would let it recoup all costs it could show
were prudent.3 In this way, customers faced the risk that challenging a pipeline's Order No. 500 plan could increase the costs
they ultimately had to pay.'
More fundamentally, even prudently incurred costs were not
guaranteed recovery. As the Commission explained in Order No.
528-A, pipeline costs were not recoverable if they were not used
and useful. This was a "second" principle, which independently
requires that "only investment in plant that is used and useful
for providing service may be included in rate base."' The Commission made it very plain that prudency was not the end-all
and be-all of regulation: "The fact that those costs may have
been prudently incurred does not mean that the pipeline must
be given the guaranteed right to recover all of those costs 3 6
E. Reasonable Expectations Were Irrelevant When The Issue
Was Cost Inefficiency
The context of natural gas' sharing model is even worse for
electric companies. FERC refused to allow recovery just because
take-or-pay contracts "may have been entered into to meet37the
reasonably anticipated needs of the pipeline's customers." It
did not fully protect these costs in spite of the fact that pipe32. Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg. at 30,341.
33. Order No. 500 called the showing of nimprudency" needed to overturn an equitable sharing plan 'difficult." Id.
34. Id. at 30,343.
35. Order No. 528-A, 54 Fed. Reg. at 61,304.
36. Id. For a general discussion of the used-and-useful doctrine, see James Hoecker,
Used and Useful: Autopsy of a Ratemaking Policy, 8 ENERGY LJ. 303 (1987). Hoecker
noted, correctly, that prudent costs had not become "the prevailing rule." See id. at 310.
To him, used and useful should function 'to exclude substantial prudent investments
from rate base or cost of service ... if a reviewing court has a basis for believing that
such a countervailing public interest is being served. Id. at 331; for additional discussion, see Richard Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled
Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L REV. 497, 511-13 (1984). For a more utilityfriendly version of the used and useful test, see JOSEPH KALT, ET Al., RE-ESTABLImNG
TH REGULATORY BARGAIN IN THE ELEc'mIc UTmrry INDuSRY (1987).
37. Order No. 528-A, 54 Fed. Reg. at 61,304.
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lines' "full anticipated needs may not have materialized in many
instances."3 The "reasonable-expectations" argument is one form
of the regulatory-bargain defense.
The reason take-or-pay contracts threatened losses was not
that pipelines had an obligation to serve customers. It was not a
demand problem at all. Service obligations did not determine
which supplies, storage, and exploration programs pipelines had
adopted to meet their obligations. It was not the scope of service, but the selection of the wrong assets, that was at stake.
These were failures in pipelines' investment decisions, decisions
where their customers had virtually no voice.
FERC understandably rejected the argument that the "reasonable expectation" of continued service was enough to guarantee no losses, even if a pipeline's investments turned out to be
very uneconomic. Stranded costs concerned the efficiency of assets, not the scope of the demand for gas. Order No. 888 would
turn this principle on its head. For reasons truly known only to
it, the Commission crafted a recovery mechanism that rests recovery on an electric company's "reasonable expectations" of continuing to serve a departing customer.39
H. FERC's ABOUT-FACE IN ELEcTcIrrY
The electric industry today finds itself in the same predicament that the gas industry suffered during the late Eighties.
Electricity is a network industry in which regulated firms take a
form of energy created in a production market that has become
competitive and use a capital-intensive transportation network
with economies of scale (i.e., the classic natural monopoly situation) to deliver the energy to consumers. 40
Interstate natural-gas pipelines ship gas from producers
over their mainlines to local distribution companies. In electricity, utilities transmit power to distribution networks that reach
consumers. The industries are different in that electricity historically has been a more integrated industry than natural gas;
electric companies are much more likely to own generation facilities than pipelines were to own gas reserves; and much more of
the overall electricity flows in intrastate commerce regulated by
38. Id.
39. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,550, 21,651-54.
40. Cf CmNDALL & ELLIG, supra note 4, at 1 (noting structural commonality, in review of natural gas, telecommunications, airline, trucking, and railroad industries, that
"[sluppliers and customers are connected via a network of pipelines, wires, air routes,
roads, or rails, and the decisions of one network user can affect the ability of others to
use the network.").
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state commissions. 41
Electricity has experienced the same regulatory stimulus as
natural gas. Congress began loosening regulations by making
utilities buy power from alternative sources and loosening restrictions on power company ownership. 42 Change accelerated
greatly when Order No. 888 created open access interstate electric wires. Electricity's open access is modeled on the natural
gas experience.
Parallels continue on the market side because electric companies made the same kind of economic mistakes that pipelines
were making at roughly the same time. Utilities responded to
the tight energy markets of the Seventies with similar inefficiency and waste. They built plants, including many nuclear
plants, whose costs turned out to be several times those of
smaller-scale gas plants. 43
41. For integration as a characteristic distinguishing electricity from natural gas,
see Donald Santa, Jr. & Clifford Sikora, Open Access and Transition Costs: Will the Electric Industry Transition Track the Natural Gas Industry Restructuring?, 15 ENERGY L.J.
273, 279 (1994); see also Richard Pierce, The State of the Transition to Competitive Markets in Natural Gas and Electricity, 15 ENERGY L.J. 323, 338 (1994) (arguing that vertical integration of industry will prevent shifting of losses similar to pipelines' transfer of
losses to producers).
42. 1978 Public Utilities Regulatory and Power Act ("PURPA"), Pub. L. No. 95-617,
92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1988)). Congress forced
utilities to buy power from alternative-power sources if they could beat the utilities' own
cost of power. As the Energy Information Administration later described the Act:
The key provision of PURPA required electric utilities to interconnect with and
purchase power from any facility meeting the criteria for a qualifying facility
(QF). It further required that the utility pay for that power at the utility's own
incremental or avoided cost of production.
EIA, THE CHANGING STRUMR OF THE ELERmc PowER INDusTRY 1970-1992, at 22 (1993)
[hereinafter EIA RFpRr]. In 1992, in another critical decision, Congress used the Energy Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992), to loosen restrictions on
ownership of generating plants. See id. at 20.
43. Electric utilities and their customers coexisted comfortably into the Sixties because the economies of scale in big plants kept lowering costs and prices. Id. at 13; see
also Bernard Black & Richard Pierce, The Choice Between Markets and CentralPlanning
in Regulating the United States Electricity Industry, 93 COLUm. L REv. 1339, 1344 (1993)
(regulatory structure accepted into late Sixties because "[tlhe real price of electric power
declined steadily because of a constant stream of technological advances... :). The real
price declines did not mean, of course, that regulated power was efficient in any real
sense during this period, only that the shoe did not pinch. Electric companies may have
been generating power at costs well above their production possibilities frontier. But
when utilities expanded into nuclear and other large-scale plants in the Seventies and
early Eighties, they made several mistakes. One, demand did not keep rising. Order No.
888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,544 & n.13. Two, interest rates, inflation, and bad planning
sharply raised costs. Id. at 21,543 & n.9. The planning for nuclear plants, for instance,
turned out to be wildly inept, with overruns of as much as one thousand percent. Pierce,
supra note 36, at 504. As with virtually every other kind of stranded cost, here too there
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The result was a great variation in costs among electric
companies, states, and regions. New, smaller plants can generate power for three to five cents a kilowatt, while large coal
plants may cost four to seven cents and nuclear plants are loss
leaders at nine to fifteen cents." Customers captive to older
plants may be paying two to three times as much for power as
necessary. Estimates of the generating assets that will be
stranded, one measure of inefficiency, run as high as $200 to
$300 billion and more. 45 Deregulation increased market exposure just when utilities have become least able to sell their
power without government help.
Because electricity is more vertically integrated than natural gas, state commissions will have more to say about electricity deregulation than they did about natural gas deregulation.
But even so, FERC's orders will guide loss recovery in intrastate
markets, too. Order No. 888's deregulation of interstate wholesale electricity has been the first major electricity deregulation
and as such is serving as a model for the states. The widespread
belief that federal natural gas deregulation has been successful"
strongly encourages belief in open access. Pressure from many
are wide differences of opinion on whether the companies or their regulators are to
blame for the problem. Three, the bigger plants turned out to be costly in operation;
their downtime and maintenance raised costs, while new technologies made 50 to 150
megawatt plants much cheaper than 500 megawatt plants. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg.
at 21,544-45 & nn.22-32. The EEI estimates the write-off during the Eighties at $16 billion. Initial Comments of Edison Electric Institute 12 (Dec. 9, 1994) [hereinafter EEI
Comments]. The problems with nuclear plants were extraordinary. Some plants overran
budgets by a factor of ten. See Black & Pierce, supra, at 1346. The total disallowance
may have ended up being as much as thirty percent of all nuclear plant costs. Id.
44. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,544 & nn.29-30 and accompanying text (citations omitted).
45. FERC cited one early study that found that interstate costs were roughly $10.4
billion in a $114 billion total investor-owned stranded cost. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 21,628 & n.567 (citing Resource Data International (RDI) study). RDI's latest
study estimates total stranded costs at $202 billion. RDI, Power Markets in the U.S. 1
(Feb. 7, 1997) [hereinafter RDI Release] (media release furnished to author). The EEI
puts the number as "more likely" to fall near $200 billion. See, eg., EEI Comments,
supra note 43, at 28. Some industry companies have put the likely costs even higher. See
Comments of Commonwealth Edison Company 16 n.4 (Dec, 9, 1994) [hereinafter CornEd
Comments] (citing attached report of Law & Economics Consulting Group economists, at
74, which suggests a range of $200 to $300 billion). The EIA found a range of "from a
low of $10 billion to $20 billion to a high of $500 billion, depending on the assumptions
and methodology used EIA UPDATE, supra note 5, at 78-79.
46. See, eg., Pierce,supra note 41, at 323-24; CRANDALL & ELLIG, supra note 4, at 917 (recounting falling prices and increases in innovations); Moler Defends FERC's FY
1997 Budget Request Against Any Further Cuts in Staffing of Natural Gas Programs,
Foster Report No. 2073, at 1 (Mar. 28, 1996) (quoting Chair Elizabeth Moler's claim that
"billions and billions of dollars" will be saved from Order No. 636 alone).
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quarters, including conservative groups seeking less government
control .over economic activity and electric companies wanting to
preserve the great boon FERC has given them for stranded
costs, supports federal legislation to replicate Order No. 888 for
state-based retail electricity.47 And the Commission interprets its
existing powers over some retail generation unusually broadly,
too.48
Order No. 888 creates an open-access interstate transmission system through which competitively generated wholesale
electricity can flow. The Commission's rationale is identical to its
natural gas belief that open access is necessary to have competition radiate out from a producing market to consumers at the
other end of a distribution system. The Commission's authority
to order open access to remedy the situation is the same, right
down to its expressly relying on Associated Gas Distributors v.

FERC, the appellate decision that confirmed FERC's power to
press interstate pipelines to become open access. 49 The method
of creating competition is the same: "open access nondiscriminatory transmission tariffs." 0 The anticompetitive behavior that
provided the impetus to action is the same as well: electric companies' inefficient investment decisions and their discriminatory
denials of access to cheaper suppliers, in this case in the generation market rather than gas purchase market:
We have identified a fundamental, generic problem in the electric industry: owners, controllers, and operators of monopoly transmission facilities
that also own power generation facilities have the incentive to engage,
and have engaged, in unduly discriminatory practices in the provision of
transmission services by denying third parties transmission services that
47. For a summary of the state of electricity deregulation and the prospect that
Congress might try to extend its reach into retail jurisdiction, see Patrick Crow, US.
Electricity Decontrol Tops Energy Agenda for 105th Congress, OIL & GAs J., Mar. 24,
1997, at 19; Sheila Hollis & Mary Ann Ralls, Stranded Costs: An Assessment of the Next
Great Energy Battle, at 17-18, prepared for IBC's 3rd Annual Industry Forum (Washington D.C. June 23-25, 1997); Delay Hopeful, Bumpers Pessimistic,Dingel Curious about
Restructuring, INSIDE F.ERC., Apr. 14, 1997, at 3. Another summary of congressional
thinking can be found in the EIA!s December 1996 publication. EIA UPDATE, supra note
5, at 43-48.
48. FERC's assertion of some retail jurisdiction probably is the weakest part of Order No. 888. The Commission's true motivation may appear in Order No. 888-A, where it
admits that retail jurisdiction was "based on a policy decision by this Commission that it
will step in to fill a regulatory 'gap' that could result in no effective forum... ." Order
No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,375. The Commission may think that robbing the states of
their traditional power over retail rates is good policy-it certainly ensures more consistency, but that hardly is a persuasive answer to what is a jurisdictional question.
49. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,560-61.
50. Id. at 21,540.
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are comparable to the transmission services that they are providing, or
are capable of providing, for their own power sales and purchases.51

Not only did regulated electric companies act uncompetitively (as judged by market standards) in the past, but FERC
found that they will not behave competitively today if left regulated. It had become "increasingly clear that the potential consumer benefits that could be derived from these technological
advances could be realized only if more efficient generating
52
plants could obtain access to the regional transmission grids."

That is, existing utilities will not adopt the most efficient technologies voluntarily.
If Order No. 888 opens up interstate electrical transmission
systems, so that suppliers can compete in selling low-cost electricity across these lines, FERC estimates that consumers will
save between $3.8 and $5.4 billion a year.5 3 These savings may
be as little as a tenth of the savings that might be achieved if
similar changes were adopted at the intrastate, retail level.5 4
This is without counting other benefits like innovation and a
better use of existing assets. 55
These changes will create many losses for utilities that built
large, expensive plants. The losses flow from the same source as
pipeline take-or-pay losses. Deregulation became necessary
when it became apparent that there was a large gap between
the costs and inefficiencies of regulated utilities, and the capability of the potential competitors standing in the wings. This
gap ensures that a large share of utilities' services will be at
risk if open access accomplishes its stated purpose-to open a
regulated market to true competition.
51. Id. at 21,566; see also id. at 21,560, 21,567. The quoted language treats only the
problem of discrimination. For the separate problem that utilities seemed unlikely to
make competitive investment decisions, see infra note 52 and accompanying text.

52. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,546.
53. Id. at 21,541, 21,550. One of the most interesting aspects of deregulation is how
little utilities have fought the conclusion that electricity can be generated much more
cheaply than regulated companies have done in recent years. The EErs economic experts
admitted bluntly that, with open competition, "many utilities would be unable to recover
a large fraction of the costs associated with these power supply commitments." EE1 Comments, supra note 43, Appendix A, Economists' Report, at 2; see Alfred Kahn, Can Regu-

lation and Competition Coexist? Solutions to the Stranded Cost Problem and Other
Conundra, 7 ELEc. J. 23, available in LEXIS (ABI/INFORM file), at 3 (1994) (arguing
that without careful deregulation, "some electric utilities may end up like the airlines,
which lost more money in three years than the industry had made in its entire
history...

7).

54. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,628 & n.567.
55. Id. at 21,541, 21,500.
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In spite of these many similarities, Order No. 888 created a
stranded cost remedy that could not be more different than the
take-or-pay remedy. FERC will allow electric utilities to recover
their stranded costs. There is to be no equitable sharing. Order
of all "legitimate, prudent and
No. 888 promises the recovery
56
verifiable stranded costs
In words pipelines longed to hear, Order No. 888 repeatedly
discusses electric companies' reliance on the regulatory scheme
in making now-unwanted investments. It belabors society's supposed need to keep the utilities that have such high costs solvent in spite of their mistakes. And it worships a form of cost
causation that never was a factor in natural gas remedies. For
these three reasons, the regulatory "bargain," utility financial
"integrity," and cost "causation," FERC decided that stranded
cost recovery is "critical to the successful transition of the electric industry to a competitive, open access environment."57 To
earn this protection, an electric company will have to show that
it had a "reasonable expectation" of continuing to serve the departing customer 58 and that it has not extinguished that right
by contract.
Though there are limits on the reach of Order No. 888's recovery mechanism-for instance, it will not apply if a utility
loses a customer to self-generation, co-generation, or by switching to a competitor without using open access 59 -the Order will
protect electric companies' major capital investments for inter56. Id. at 21,540.
57. Id. at 21,630. Technically, Order No. 888 grafts a right to recover stranded costs
onto wholesale requirements contracts that are silent about stranded costs. Utilities
with wholesale requirements contracts dated before July 11, 1994 (the date of FERC's
electricity open access NOPR) whose contracts allowed stranded costs will recover by the
contract terms. Contracts after this date will have to have an express recovery provision
for any costs to be imposed on the departing customer. Id. at 21,638-39. Those pre-July
11, 1994 contracts whose terms prohibit recovery will not get any relief Id. at 21,639-44.
The many utilities whose pre-July 11, 1994 wholesale requirements contracts do not address stranded costs can file to recover "legitimate, prudent and verifiable" costs
stranded by departing wholesale customers. The Commission will rewrite the contracts
of these companies to permit recovery, thus upending the bargain between the utility
and these customers.
58. Id. at 21,630. This restriction should not be overemphasized; Order No. 888 did
not decide what to do with utilities who could not show a "reasonable expectation7 of
continuing service, so these costs too may end up being recoverable from at least some
customers. See id. at 21,653-54. On the other hand, this standard suggests a lot of litigation over at least two of its aspects. First, was there a reasonable expectation at alldoes the utility have a right to an Order No. 888 recovery? Second, if so, how long does
the expectation last? The duration of expectations will be another fertile field for
litigation.
59. Id. at 21,630.
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state electricity supply. The high level of protection is underlined by the Commission's assurance that it will not let customers relitigate the prudence of costs already recovered.60 Many
electricity customers will end up paying for the mistakes utilities made by investing in assets now left61unused because wholesale customers prefer cheaper suppliers.
Order No. 888 might, in theory, end up disallowing a lot of
costs if FERC finds that electric companies did not have a "reasonable expectation" of serving this or that departing customer.
The Commission may find that some utilities contracted away
their right to stranded cost recovery; that some companies did
not take reasonable steps to mitigate; or that a number of losses
are due to self-generation or other changes that do not involve
the interstate electricity network.
But narrow readings of Order No. 888 seem unlikely. Certainly they would contravene the thrust of the Order. FERC has
created a great shelter from prudency by its decision not to relitigate prudency of "recovered" costs. 6 2 It has made "reasonable

expectations" very favorable to utilities by its decision that just
having a service area protected under state law will make the
"reasonable expectations" standard "easily met." And the Com60. Id. at 21,664.
61. In Order No. 888-A, FERC at least implied that Order No. 888 really is a marginal order that only assists recovery of a few stranded costs. Yet not only does Order No.
888 cover the category of interstate costs that will worry electric companies (generating
costs), but in addition, the Order would not satisfy the Commission's worries about financial integrity unless it has a substantial, not small, effect on utility costs. Add the
Orders likely effect on retail costs, and Order No. 888 will be the single most important
influence on the treatment of all stranded costs, unless Congress passes a bill that covers retail costs nationally.
The Commission argues that it is a mistake to read Order No. 888 as if it guarantees utilities any relief Hence its reminder that it has not barred prudency review;, that
the Order only applies to costs stranded using the new open access; and that the utility
must meet the reasonable expectations standard. This Article already has shown why
these arguments are palliatives at best (unless the Commission gives a very restrictive
reading to 'reasonable expectations"). They have to be palliatives in the Commission's
logic, as otherwise the Order will not avoid what the Commission has grandly painted as
a threat to utility financial integrity.
62. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,391.
63. Id. at 21,651. It will be interesting to see what the Commission does when it
faces a utility that had a guaranteed service area, but a contract with a notice of termination provision. Because here as elsewhere the test is supposed to be "factual,* the answer is going to be, "almost anything' In a somewhat comical battle of the wrong rules,
the Commission made the equally one-sided decision that contracts with termination
clauses will create a rebuttable presumption that there was no reasonable expectation of
continued service. Id. at 21,653. All this in spite of the fact that many very long-running
contracts had such terms even though no one expected them to expire anytime soon. An
ironic result of Order No. 888 is that it may prevent battle on the issues that should
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mission has not even disallowed costs stranded by other means,
like self-generation; instead all FERC has said is that Order64No.
888 "is not intended... to apply" to these stranded losses.
Perhaps just as bad, under the reasonable expectations test,
there is no need for whatever loss recovery is denied to have anything to do with the investment inefficiency that produced the
exposure. Recovery will turn on how tightly the electric company bound its customers, not on whether it made mistakes in
building plants and signing supply contracts. Some of the most
inefficient utilities may be the greatest beneficiaries of Order
No. 888.
Order No. 888 almost has to be utility friendly, because otherwise it cannot address the Commission's fear for utility financial integrity. The Order pampers utilities because it removes
utility responsibility for excessive, even grossly excessive, costs
as a factor in the pass-through decision. 65
A. FERC Rejected Cost Responsibility As the Electricity
Recovery Principle, Turning Instead to Regulatory Reliance,
FinancialIntegrity, and Cost Causation
The most significant break with the natural gas orders, the
great divide, is FERC's shift in attention to the alleged regulatory bargain, worries about utility finances, and cost causation.
Order No. 888 turns its back on the Commission's natural gas
traditions.
The utility-friendly outcome reflects the unexplained decision to switch the basic principle for recovery. No longer is it responsibility for buying uneconomic assets, but instead the new
triad of regulatory reliance, financial integrity, and cost causation. The Commission justified electricity's full pass-through by
factors that played no role in its natural gas orders. Order No.
888 unfolds as if the Commission can pick a new guiding principle every time it deregulates a new industry.6
matter, like who is to blame for the very overpriced power generated by today's utilities,
but it will cause large-scale warfare over irrelevancies like the nature of the service obligation, utility by utility, and whether their supply contracts have termination clauses.
64. Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,381, 12,391.
65. It is perhaps true that grossly excessive costs will tend to be those that looked
imprudent even when incurred, so that some grossly excessive costs may have been
weeded out under that test. But Richard Pierce probably is correct that the prudency
test has not, in general, been an effective screen against inefficient company decisionmaking. See Pierce, supra note 36, at 511-12.
66. Given Order No. 636s attempt to allow full recovery for the last set of pipeline
stranded costs, one might even write: a new principle for every new order.
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FERC gave priority to the regulatory reliance argument.
The "regulatory bargain's" function is to let utilities escape market judgment. The claim is that even if utility plant and contracts have turned out to be inefficient, the investments were
made in reliance upon the regulated regime, were approved
under that regime, and this should be enough to guarantee electric companies a right to recovery as long as they had a reasonable expectation of serving a departing customer,6 7 and did not
already cede that right by contract. Order No. 888 will protect
many companies even if they succumbed to regulations worst
dulling effects and were woefully lax in investing. Indeed, it will
reward inefficiency, because utilities that made the worst investments, and so have the most stranded costs, will need, and tend
to get, the most relief Efficient regulated utilities may find they
have no stranded costs at all. The fact that electric companies
received their franchises to provide the lowest cost power, and
that many made very bad investments that are preventing them
from doing so, can get lost quickly. So too can any duty of electric companies to have been efficient in purchasing.
Order No. 888 brims with references to utilities' "reasonable
expectation that [their] customers would renew their contracts
and would pay their share of long-term investments and other
incurred costs." 68 Electric utilities faced losses because they invested under an "entirely different regulatory regime."69 In this
view, deregulation undermined an existing bargain between regulators and the companies:
[W]e do not believe that utilities that made large capital expenditures or
long-term contractual commitments to buy power years ago should now
be held responsible for failing to foresee the actions this Commission
would take to alter the use of their transmission systems in response to
the fundamental changes that are taking place in the industry. We will
not ignore the effects of recent significant statutory and regulatory
changes on the past investment decisions of utilities. While... there has
always been some risk that a utility would lose a particular customer, in
the past that risk was smaller ....
With 7the
new open access, the risk
0
of losing a customer is radically increased.

Order No. 888-A is just as direct about the "regulatory bargain" and regulatory reliance. "[U]pholding the regulatory bar67. For the contrary natural gas experience, see supra notes 37-38 and accompany-

ing text.
68. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,549.
69. Id. at 21,629.
70. Id. at 21,629-30.
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gain under which utilities made major capital investments" was
one of the "important" interests served by Order No. 888.71 The
full recovery for stranded costs arose from a supposed "balancing" of "the regulatory bargain under which utilities invested
billions of dollars in reliance on the prior regulatory
regime... "72
Although deregulation was sparked by inefficient utility
costs, Order No. 888 shifts the responsibility question from responsibility for those costs, which should be the root concern of
deregulation, to the regulations that brought in competition as a
remedy, an irrelevant issue.
B. FERC Has FictitiouslyPortrayedRegulation as the Central
Cause of Stranded Electricity Costs
Regulatory reliance arguments do not logically require that
stranded costs be caused by regulation (for instance, companies
might have a regulatory promise that they could recover even
losses caused by their own mistakes, as in fact will occur under
Order No. 888), but the claim that utilities were promised recovery tends to go hand in hand with the claim that changes in
regulation are the only real cause of stranded costs.
Order No. 888-A, for instance, the Commission's last word
on electricity, adamantly blames regulation for electric companies' problems. To handle objections to its about-face from natural gas, the Commission had to argue that "the market" largely
caused take-or-pay losses, but that, in contrast, the main threat
to electric utilities is regulatory change. Pipelines' take-or-pay
problems allegedly "were caused more by general market conditions than by any regulatory action of the Commission."73 In
electricity, in contrast, "recent significant statutory and regulatory changes are central to the circumstances that now place at
risk the recovery of past investment decisions."' 4 Electricity's
problems "arise as the direct result of Congress' and the Commission's change in the regulatory regime through FPA Section
211 and Order No. 888."75
FERC did not give this implausible reading any factual
grounding. Certainly the gas industry's problems in the late
71. Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,373.
72. Id. at 12,377.
73. Id. at 12,394.
74. Id. at 12,375.
75. Id. at 12,394. The Commission identified 'the widespread transmission access
made available through Commission-mandated transmission tariffs" as the 'driving force
behind the development of wholesale competitive markets! Id. at 12,377.
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Eighties were no less a product of government action than the

situation in electricity today. The overall industry conditions
have remarkably similar causes. The Commission itself recog-

nized this when it justified electricity open access using natural
gas precedent. But FERC's eagerness to take shelter under natural gas precedent when justifying open access generally is not
matched by equal, or even minimal, respect for its natural gas

handling of stranded costs.
The fabrication of a dichotomy between natural gas and
electricity, as if pipelines made market mistakes but electric

companies did not, while regulation grievously injured electric
companies but barely affected pipelines, ignores the many gov-

ernment changes that contributed to the take-or-pay problem. 7

Pipelines would not have faced a market cutting the floor out

from under their gas costs without gas deregulation. Congress
removed controls on wellhead prices, FERC voided minimum
bills, and then it imposed open access. Furthermore, pipelines
had suffered from more regulatory involvement and distortion'
than electric companies in certain ways because new pipeline facilities traditionally had been "certificated" by FERC, while the

Commission did not perform similar oversight of electric

plants, 77 and because the Commission had imposed minimum reserve-life requirements on pipeline gas supplies.7 8
76. The role of government changes appeared as defenses in many take-or-pay lawsuits. Pipelines claimed changes in government regulation as events of force mqjeure.
The reason that this defense generally was not successful, even though regulations certainly increased pipelines' exposure and risk, is that this was not the kind of risk that
most force majeure clauses covered. Many take-or-pay contracts had a separate, more
specific "FERC-out" clause that required producers to refund any portion of take-or-pay
prepayments (or of prices on gas taken) that FERC disallowed. Thus there was a much
more precise, but limited, remedy for government action. Because FERC did not disallow
any take-or-pay charges (and carefully said, several times, that it was not abrogating
take-or-pay contracts), the Commission's role in contributing to the take-or-pay problem
did not create a defense for the buyer under those contracts.
77. See generally Hoecker, supra note 36, at 314 n.53.
78. The great emphasis on reserves appeared in the laborious filings pipelines made
in FERC Form 2, in which the companies had to list their natural-gas reserves. The
shortages encountered during the Energy crises had made all parties to the industry
greatly sensitive to the risk of running out of gas.
One reason that changes in the natural gas market of the Eighties may look more
"market driven" to the Commission than those in electricity today may be the less perfect regulatory bounds of state gas production. There certainly was more competition in
intrastate gas markets before the NGPA than there is in retail electricity markets today.
The problems with federal gas pricing became more pronounced as production shifted to
intrastate markets. Electricity has not seen the same kind of pressure from the intrastate sector.
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Conversely, it is stretching the truth to suggest that the
"central" cause of electric companies' problems is regulatory.
Equally essential to electricity's stranded costs are very bad utility investments. The plant, fuel-supply contracts, and technology
that can produce the lowest generating costs are far different
than the investments that many utilities have been making in
the last few decades. Some of the difference in generation costs
may be due to obligations that regulators stuck onto utilities,
but the huge disparity in average costs among companies and
regions, and the gap from competitive levels, cannot be explained without recognizing a lot of private-market mistakes.
Regulated interstate electric companies have made many errors
of judgment. That is why the industry is being deregulated.
Competition may only have been able to reach electricity markets because open access removed government-imposed barriers
to competition, but the same was true in natural gas. Had
FERC not forced open access through in Order No. 436, pipelines would not have faced extraordinary take-or-pay losses. Today Order No. 888 is playing the same role in electricity.
FERC seems determined to ignore the fact that stranded
costs in natural gas and electricity have two independent but
necessary causes. Regulatory changes created the exposure to a
competitive generating market that puts uneconomic assets at
risk. But costs are stranded by competition only because utilities made inefficient investments in the first place. The problem
is rooted in regulated firms' failure to keep pace with major
shifts in underlying technologies and production standards. 79 In
that sense, it is because "the market" opened up a gap between
regulated performance and potential competitive levels that restructuring has had to occur.
Deregulation arises from the judgment that FERC's charges
have fallen short of achievable levels of efficiency. Pipelines and
electric companies were not meeting their duty to serve the public interest. This understanding is radically inconsistent with
FERC's decision that electric companies should not "be held responsible for failing to foresee the actions this Commission
79. It is no accident that both FERC and the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC), author of the first major state deregulation, recited the ways that jurisdictional
firms had fallen behind market standards. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,543-50.
The CPUC's economic presumptions are oddly missing from its deregulation order, but
they are stated clearly in the staff report that spurred the push for deregulation. See

CPUC,

DIVISION OF STRATEGIC PLANNING, CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRIC SERVICES INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON THE PAST, STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTuRE ch. IV (1993) [hereinafter YELLow

REPORT].

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

would take to alter the use of their transmission systems ....

"80

Why not? After all, the Commission found that utilities built
inefficient plants; protected those plants by discriminating in
their control of their wires; and that these practices are costing
consumers up to $5.4 billion a year. These are the reasons
FERC found itself acting to "alter the use of [utilities'] transmission systems.&" This was not the kind of behavior allowed to hide
behind reliance on the regulatory scheme in Order Nos. 380,
436, and 500. For reasons that cannot be reconciled, it is being
protected in Order No. 888.
The largest electric utilities inundated FERC with pleading
that all of their problems can be attributed to regulation. And,
indeed, a larger share of electricity stranded costs may well
have been "caused" by direct regulatory compulsion than takeor-pay contracts. If so, this might justify tilting the equitable
sharing balance more in electric companies' favor, but not a rule
that allows pass-through of all stranded costs.
C. Suddenly, FinancialIntegrity Supports One Hundred
Percent Cost Recovery
Another sign of how far Order No. 888 strays from the principles of natural gas deregulation is FERC's assertion that utilities need pass-through financially. The Commission claimed that
recovery was required for the utilities' financial integrity. It did
not show that any particular company would fail without Order
No. 888's special protection.
One reason the Commission may have stayed away from
discussing the bottom line of any given utility is that Order No.
888's stranded costs, unlike take-or-pay losses, are only a small
part of the costs that would be stranded by full industry-wide
deregulation.8 1 Both commentators and the Commission often
spoke as if Order No. 888 dealt with the full risks of industrywide deregulation, including open access for retail as well as
wholesale generation, yet the Commission only has jurisdiction
over the small wholesale part of this market.
And in fact, however one counts likely stranded costs, and
in spite of some contrary language in Order Nos. 888 and 88880. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,629.
81. The Commission admitted that the Order's stranded costs may be only one-tenth
of total industry stranded costs. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (assuming
similar reforms are adopted at the state level). The Order did not try to show whether
these costs would be a major threat to any particular utility. Id.
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electric companies' stranded costs are almost certain to be
concentrated in a small number of companies even in the wholesale market.8 3 Order Nos. 888 and 888-A will subsidize these
companies at the expense of their smarter competitors.84
Moreover, the Commission's view of financial integrity is too
rigid. The presumption of dire financial results takes no account
of increased efficiencies, of new forms of risk sharing with customers, and of other measures that utilities could take to mitigate the impact of their inefficient power. Rather than consider
factors like these, FERC repeatedly opined that utilities "could"
fail without full recovery. It spoke of the "prospect of not recovering such costs," which "could erode utilities' ability to attract
capital and be very detrimental to a diverse array of utility
shareholders"; and of an inability to recover those costs that
"could impair the financial ability of a utility to continue to provide reliable service."85
A,82

82. FERC reiterated a concern with "financial stability" as one of its guiding principles in Order No. 888-A. Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,373. It claimed that open
access "radically increased" the risk of not recovering costs. Id. at 12,376; accord Order
No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,629-30. Throughout Order Nos. 888 and 888-A, the financial
integrity discussion proceeds as if all utilities would be jeopardized if stranded cost protection is not imposed.
83. In its February 7, 1997 study, RDI concluded that half of expected stranded
costs, $100 billion, rest with a "small group of only 20 utilities.! RDI Release, supra note
45, at 2. Given the small number of utilities in most states, it is not surprising that this
distribution of losses among companies produces a similarly disproportionate concentration of the problem among states. RDI believes that ten states have 86% of expected
stranded costs, even though they produce only 43% of the country's electricity. Id. at 3.
It is telling that the EEI, whose stranded cost comments are written as if the organization has been captured by the companies with the largest stranded costs, religiously
avoids any discussion of how stranded costs are distributed among its members. If the
EEI did address this issue, it would become dearer that its strong push for full recovery
is special pleading for just some, albeit the largest and, most powerful, of its members.
The EIA has performed its own calculations confirming the great variability in average electricity prices and expected stranded costs by region. See EIA UPDATE, supra note
5, at 80-81.
84. As one would expect, this point is put most forcefully by the utilities and consumers who have fewer costs. See, ag., Preliminary Comments of Electricity Consumers
Resource Council et al, at 12 (May 20, 1995) [hereinafter Elcon Comments] ("In sum,
FERC has crafted a sorely inefficient system designed to bail out a discrete set of utilities whose financial woes bear no relation to the oft-invoked transition! to competition.!);
Comments on Stranded Cost Aspects of the Supplemental NOPR by ELCON et al, at 14
(July 25, 1995) ("[U]tilities that have braced for competition will be placed at a disadvantage relative to their poorly-managed competitors.").
85. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,630, 21,642 (quoting F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs.
32,507, at 32,870); see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Recovery of Stranded
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,274, 35,280-81
(1994).
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The Commission did say that "[tihe financial community
commenters [sic] confirm our views in this regard." 8 6 Of course
they did. It is in their self-interest to make the potential losses
sound as disastrous as possible. But reciting the assertions of
interested parties is not reasoned decisionmaking. The financial
community will lose billions of dollars if FERC does not passthrough stranded costs. Naturally its representatives will say
pass-through is necessary to preserve financial health (their financial health). They are happy to predict, because it costs
them nothing but may gain them the world, that special government protection is necessary to save innocent shareholders, the
GDP, the market, competition, security of supply, all widowers
who ever bought utility stocks, and almost anything and anyone
else that regulators might value. But one can look long and
hard for facts that would meet even the most minimal stan87
dards of proof.

And even if some utilities go bankrupt, that is just what
one would hope for companies that made inefficient and at
times discriminatory decisions. The Commission's duty to consumer welfare could have been better served by rules helping
these companies operate through bankruptcy, thus keeping their
wires, plants, and good will intact, and making sure that the
most efficient successors bid for their assets, than by Order No.
888's bailout provisions.
Pipeline shareholders had good grounds to make the same
financial integrity arguments. Indeed, two natural gas pipelines
went bankrupt in the wake of gas deregulation.88 The fact that
86. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,642.
87. Order No. 888 offers no significant factual support for its financial-integrity
worry. All the Commission does is cite a handful of commentators from the "financial
community" who, of course, will paint this as a huge problem in hopes of making sure
that FERC protects their investments. See id. at 21,628 & n.559, 21,642 & n.681. There
is no discussion of the expected exposure of any specific utility, a showing how this
stacked up against its assets, or any effort to collect data and measure the industry-wide
problem. The Texas PUC suggested that the Commission "address financial problems
only as needed." Comments of the Public Utility Commission of Texas, at 4 (Dec. 2,
1994) [hereinafter Texas PUC Comments]. In that way, "FERC could ensure that only
those utilities with legitimate financial integrity concerns could apply for stranded cost
recovery." Id. As FERC would not give its view of the total costs it expects stranded by
Order No. 888, much less those of any given utility, all a reviewing court can do is guess
at just how much of a problem the Commission really believes no-recovery would give to
some utilities.
88. The fate of those pipelines is a reminder that neither heavy financial losses nor
even bankruptcy necessarily spells disaster for either the utility or its customers, though
the odds of shareholder losses certainly rise. Thus the United Gas Pipe Line was acquired by Koch after it declared bankruptcy, Columbia Gas has used bankruptcy law's
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shareholders would be hurt if they bear stranded costs is irrelevant to the true issue, which is whether electric companies
should face losses when due to their own inefficiency and discrimination. If shareholder-owned utilities bought overly expensive generating plants and tried to protect their mistakes by discriminatory control of their lines, why shouldn't the
shareholders pay, just as pipeline shareholders paid?
To the extent that concerns about financial integrity were
based on a desire to protect the physical network that delivers
power, those concerns could have been met without rewarding
electric companies. FERC could have solved that problem
through corporate unbundling. The significance of its decision to
order only functional unbundling is that it tied the health of a
utility's transmission and distribution systems to its inefficient
generating assets. Had FERC mandated corporate unbundling,
it could have protected transmission and distribution affiliates,
along with any economies in the scale of their operations, even
if generating affiliates lost their ability to compete. Given the
Commission's finding that the market for new generation is
competitive, 9 the Commission should believe that any failures
on the generation side of the business would be balanced by the
entry of new companies. 0
Electric companies do face one disadvantage, compared to
pipelines. Pipelines were able to shift most of their exposure
back onto producers because of the loose structure of the natural
gas industry.91 Many electric companies, companies that in general are more likely to own their production assets, will not
reorganization provisions to restructure its obligations and has re-emerged as a going
concern. With the amount of money looking for a home in the deregulated electricity industry, failed utilities are good candidates for takeover. There are a number of ways that
companies can handle stranded costs without jeopardizing their ability to provide service
or to raise fresh capital.
89. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,542, 21,549-50, 21,553-54.
90. Someone would have to pay the transactions costs of this realignment of market
shares. But the whole idea behind deregulation is that the efficiency gains from competition outweigh the costs of transition, so it would hardly be appropriate for the Commission to protect utilities because of the transactions costs of opening up their markets.
91. Producers bore over eighty percent of pipelines' accrued take-or-pay exposure
when producers wrote down the value of their contracts in settlements. FERC calculated
that over $44 billion in take-or-pay liabilities settled for just 18.6 cents on the dollar. Order No. 500-H, 54 Fed. Reg. at 52,356, Table 5. Ironically, though it seemed a great victory for producers when the Commission had indicated that it would not intervene in
what it viewed as the primarily private contract disputes over take-or-pay liability, the
result was that producers did worse than the regulated parties--pipelines and their customers. Three-way equitable sharing that included producers might have made pipelines
pay more of the overall take-or-pay cost.
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have a similar luxury. Yet balanced against this difference is the
fact that Order No. 888 concerns only a small part of the
stranded cost problem, the costs stemming from wholesale
power, and the fact that these costs seem concentrated in a
small number of companies. Some utilities might need financial
relief, just as at least the two pipelines that went bankrupt
needed help; but FERC has not developed a record that shows
Order No. 888 really will cause an industry-wide financial
problem.
In the telling contrast with Order No. 528-A already discussed, but one that the Commission fails to mention, FERC rejected pipeline arguments that their financial jeopardy required
full cost recovery. Dealing with natural gas, it decided instead
that equitable sharing "permits [pipelines] to recover a sufficiently large percentage of the costs so that their financial viability and ability
to provide service to their customers is not
92
undermined.
The Commission cannot distinguish natural gas by arguing
that electric companies' financial risk is so much more extraordinary that they need to recover all of their costs, because
it has argued just the opposite. In Order Nos. 888, 888-A, and
636-C, the Commission retrospectively claimed that pipelines'
take-or-pay exposure was so extraordinarily large that it helped
justify making all segments of the gas industry, including pipelines, share take-or-pay losses.9 3 With the risk to that industry

92. Order No. 528-A, 54 F.E.R.C. at 61,304.
93. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,557 (painting take-or-pay situation as "market
failure" that justified 'extraordinary measure" of voiding minimum bills), 21,637 (making pipelines shoulder some costs was "an extraordinary measure given the nature of the
take-or-pay problem and the prevailing environment at that time"); Order No. 888-A, 62
Fed. Reg. at 12,392 ("fundamental premise" of Order No. 500 was "'extraordinary nature"' of take-or-pay problem) (quoting KN Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1301
(D.C. Ci. 1992)), 12,393 (using term "extraordinary expense"), 12,393 (discussing "extraordinary market conditions" surrounding take-or-pay); Order No. 636-C, Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation under Part 284 of the Commission's Regulations, 78 F.E.R.C. 9 61,186, at 61,784
.(1997) [hereinafter Order No. 636-C] (citing "extraordinary nature" of the "massive costa"
pipelines risked incurring).
The Commission vacillates on just what was "extraordinary" about the take-or-pay
problem. Whatever was extraordinary, it seems to be growing even more extraordinary
with time, a process that itself is a bit extraordinary. But financial scope clearly is included. Of course, what FERC really wants "extraordinary" to mean is "just different
enough to justify a new rule for electricity," without having to do the intellectual work of
really justifying the differences--which it cannot, because material differences do not
exist.
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so substantial, it made no sense to let any party escape scotfree from this shared responsibility.
The Commission's failure to temper its worry about electric
companies' financial integrity company-by-company is inconsistent with another part of its Order No. 888 approach. FERC has
chosen to examine "reasonable expectations" company-bycompany, customer-by-customer. It just as easily could have
studied finances company-by-company. It certainly would have
been fairer to protect financial integrity on a case-by-case basis.94 This is particularly so when the major stranded costs seem

likely to be concentrated in a handful of companies.
D.

'Cost Causation"that No Longer Is Really Causationfor
Costs

Yet another sign of the way in which the Commission has
abandoned its natural gas principles is its infatuation with the
misnamed doctrine of "cost causation." This principle had no
part in the design of natural gas' equitable sharing.
A number of commentators had urged that utility shareholders pay for at least some of their companies' stranded assets, "because at least some of the responsibility for stranded
95
costs lies with poor business decisions by utility management."
That is a good description of what happened in natural gas,
even if the Commission stayed away from assigning relative
weights to pipelines' poor business decisions. In electricity,
though, the Commission responded that "we believe it is appropriate" that departing customers bear all costs stranded by their
departure. 96 It defended this decision as consistent with "the
well-established principle of cost causation, namely, that the
party who has caused a cost to be incurred should pay it."

7

In

contrast, "[a] broad-based approach... would violate the cost
causation principle by shifting costs to customers (such as transmission users of the utility's system) that had no responsibility
94. Worrying about financial integrity yet using a formula that protects "reasonable
expectations" is inconsistent. Very solvent utilities that meet the test will be protected;
shaky, nearly bankrupt companies that built plants without a proper expectation will be
denied recovery and jeopardized anyway. Thus the mechanism for recovery is not related
at all to a utility's financial integrity. The reason this may not be fair criticism is that
the Commission has careflfly not decided what to do about costs that do not meet the
Order No. 888 test, and it will be no surprise if it ultimately lets companies pass those
costs along to remaining customers.
95. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,634 & n.629.
96. Id. at 21,634.
97. I& at 21,635.
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for stranding the costs in the first place."9g FERC claimed that
Order No. 500's equitable sharing had been a rare departure
from this principle.99 This position in turn seems to parrot dictum in one of the District of Columbia's decisions on natural gas
cost recovery10°
It is not departing customers who "cause" the stranding of
costs. Order No. 888 requires open access because utilities, not
departing customers, have been building inefficient plants and
buying uneconomic power. It is that inefficiency that strands
costs. Open access exposes these facilities and contracts to competition. If utilities find their power stranded, it will be because
their plant and supply contract choices were not competitive and
their customers have responded to market signals, just as FERC
intended. It is not because departing customers have done something to injure a legitimate utility interest. Nor is it because
these customers forced utilities to acquire the wrong plants and
98. Id. For other references to cost causation, see id. at 21,636-37 (defending passthrough as consistent with the traditional regulatory concept of cost causation).
99. See id. at 21,637 (calling equitable sharing a "limited' " departure-" 'both in
time and scope' " -from the "time-honored principle? of cost causation) (quoting K N Energy v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
100. In RN Energy, 968 F.2d at 1296-97, a customer appealed KN Energy's Order
No. 500 plan for take-or-pay costs. In a history that has little to do with what the Commission actually said in its orders, the court claimed that FERC "has instead taken the
position that circumstances surrounding the take-or-pay crisis and the transformation of
the pipeline industry necessitate and justify the crafting of new ratemaking principles."
Id at 1301. To this court at least, FERC's allocation of gas costs to customers who "may
not have directly caused them" was "acceptable" because of the Commission's judgment
that "the extraordinary nature of this problem requires the aid of the entire industry to
solve it" and that there was "no other alternative[ ]: Id. The court divined FERC's second rationale for this treatment to be that all parties to the industry would benefit from
deregulation. Id. In the federal court's stab at rule-massaging, if not rulemaking, it held
that these rationales could be "reconciled with the NGA," but apparently only "given the
unusual circumstances surrounding the take-or-pay problem, and the limited natureboth in time and scope-of the Commission's departure from the cost-causation principle." Id.
It would be a bet worth taking that no lay reader of the gas deregulation orders and
the related appellate opinions (except RN Energy) could come away believing that the
Commission had done something almost illegitimate, justified only by the "unusual" circumstances and the "limited" nature of the remedy. One can speculate whether RN Energy was the last straw for a Commission much bloodied by repeated reversals of its gas
deregulation orders. When that opinion suggested a surer basis for stranded costs by
resting them on "cost causation" (indeed, offering the Commission a chance to use a
methodology it could blame on the court), FERC took the hint in electricity. Certainly
what can be called the reading of Order No. 500 through KN-colored glasses is not a
natural reading. No one could tell from Order No. 500 that equitable sharing was a departure from mainline regulatory principles.
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supply contracts. 10 1 If one looks for the "cause" of stranding, one
investing,
need look no further than the inadequacy of 1utilities'
02
place.
first
the
in
deregulation
for
the reason
This is the same supply/demand confusion already discussed. The inefficiency problem that deregulation remedies is a
supply problem that has shown up in very high electricity costs.
The question of utilities' ties to their customers is, in contrast,
one of the way that 'regulation structured market demand.
While there are links between these two market aspects-utilities certainly made many assumptions about cost pass-through
and inelastic demand when they decided to build capitalintensive plants and enter long-term contracts-it is the supply
problem that has produced the great movement to expose regulated markets to competition.
Put into Order No. 888's language of "reasonable expectations," the relevant issue in a deregulated world is not (as the
Order assumes) whether a utility has a reasonable expectation
of serving a departing customer. It is whether it ever had a reasonable expectation that it would keep customers and recover
costs when its service became very uncompetitive. It is the excessive cost of service, not the fact of providing service, that
spawned deregulation. FERC is welcoming new firms because
too many major utilities have been inefficient in the way they
provide their obligatory service.
The answer in natural gas and in the theory that drives
deregulation is that there is no reasonable expectation of guaranteed recovery for uncompetitive assets. That is the true reason why "cost causation" was not the basis for the natural gas
orders. And it is why cost causation should not have emerged in
electricity deregulation either.
101. See Elcon Comments, supra note 84, at 13:

Utility customers did not "cause" 19C/kWh nuclear plants. Customers did not
"cause" utilities to sign contracts for QF power at above avoided cost rates.
Customers did not "cause" utilities to spend exorbitant sums on demand-side
management programs designed first to compensate the utility for reduced demand and only second to conserve power. Customers cannot "cause? costs to exceed those that would otherwise prevail in a competitive market.
102. Order Nos. 888 and 888-A somewhat deceptively try to shift (and narrow) the
causation issue to who should bear stranded costs between departing customers and all
other customers. But this begs the real question, which is why any customers should
have to pay for mistakes that were made, at least in very significant part, by the utilities. Why shouldn't shareholders pay for at least some of this risk? Why should invest-

ing in private companies be treated as if it involved no market risk?
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E. In Electricity, Unlike Natural Gas, Exposure to Competition
Will Be Compensable
Another way to measure the difference between natural gas
and electricity deregulation is by FERC's willingness in electricity, but not in natural gas, to sacrifice gains from competition in
order to pay out existing utility investments. In Order Nos. 380
and 436, FERC imposed competitive structures without protecting pipeline investments in two old regulatory assets, minimum
bills and closed access. The Commission did so in the service of
its fundamental purpose, the protection of consumer welfare.
When it finally faced the take-or-pay problem squarely, in Order
No. 500, it made pipelines bear a heavy part of those losses too.
To the extent that pipeline expectations and needs conflicted
with consumer welfare, the Commission repeatedly has weighed
in on the side of consumers in its gas restructuring orders. 10 3
When the Commission decided on full pass-through of
stranded costs in electricity, it reversed this balance. This time
it guaranteed a delay in achieving a competitive market. It is
going to pay electric companies for their exposure to competition. The Commission admitted that full stranded cost recovery
"may delay some of the benefits of competitive bulk power markets."1°4 Those who opposed full recovery generally were more
blunt. 0 5
Moreover, when FERC decided to let utilities recover
stranded costs, it exacerbated the problem by the way it decided
to measure and impose those costs. Rather than compile a company's net loss over all its customers and treat those costs as a
103. In Order No. 380, for instance, the Commission ultimately decided that the
"benefit of eliminating variable cost recovery through minimum bills," a benefit to consumers, "outweighs the negative impact such action will have upon pipelines and upon
full requirements customers." Wisconsin Gas v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1157 (D.C. Cir.
1985). This priority of interests was clear in Order No. 500 as well, even though pipelines did receive some relief from equitable sharing when the Commission rejected pipeline "reasonable expectations" arguments as a justification for cost recovery. See supra
notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
104. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,633.
105. See, eg., NRRI Comments, supra note 17, at 19-20 ("The Commission's proposed policy cannot help but appear to be protection for inefficient utilities ....Even if
the Commission were able to implement its proposal unchallenged, it would take years
for the benefits of competition to reach consumers."); Comments of the City and County
of San Francisco, at 11 (Aug. 7, 1995) (discussing FERC's proposition "that those that
seek to avail themselves of competitive alternatives must reimburse the incumbent utility en toto for the very costs that rendered its rates uneconomic in the first place ....
[Tihe Commission may have created a zero-sum game, in which savings from competitively acquired power are offset dollar-for-dollar by stranded investment responsibility.").
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sunk cost to be spread across all customers, so that it would not
distort their future purchases, the Commission will let utilities
impose an "exit fee" on each departing customer. Utilities will
bill the customer directly for the revenues "lost" due to its departure. 16 Even the Commission conceded that this "direct assignment" will remove many customers' incentives to switch.
"[T]he departing generation customer may see little or no savings in the short-term by switching power."10 7 Actually, exit fees
may increase the average cost of power for a customer who
switches. This mechanism of recovery is so anticompetitive that
it was opposed by the two federal antitrust agencies, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.0 8
106. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,633-38.
107. Id. at 21,636; see also id. ("M[lt is possible that some customers may not be able
to afford to leave as soon as they would like). While the Commission claimed that
"f[numerous parties representing all constituencies support direct assignment," id. at
21,633, others objected, among other things, that it "would discourage customers from
switching to other generation providers and would thereby inhibit competition." IM at
21,634 (footnote omitted). Some also questioned whether departing customers were the
sole cause of stranded costs. IM
108. The problem with exit fees is that if a customer is going to have to pay for its
old power anyway, it generally may as well use it. In contrast, if stranded costs were recovered through a fixed charge on all customers, regardless of whether they used an old
supplier or new supplier, they still should pick the most efficient, least-cost producer as
they weighed the marginal cost of each additional unit of power. Even ComEd's economists reach this conclusion. See CoinEd Comments, Law and Economics Report, supra
note 45, at 55 n.54 ("Exit fees as the only instrument for stranded cost recovery are incompatible with a competitive and unregulated wholesale market).
Both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, which conspicuously and somewhat oddly took no position on the propriety of recovering stranded costs
generally even though that is the major competitive issue, criticized "excise fees! as a recovery mechanism. See Comments of the U.S. Department of Justice, at 15 (Aug. 7,
1995) ("excise approach effectively increases the unit price of a customer's future services, likely leading the customer to reduce its future electricity purchases and to accept
substitutes ... that are more costly"); Comments of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission, at 5, 35 (Aug. 7, 1995) ("Structuring stranded cost
recovery as excise charges is likely to distort price signals and lead to inefficiencies... !); see also NRRI Comments, supra note 17; Comments of the Vermont Dept.
of Public Service, at 9 (Dec. 9, 1994) (arguing that Commission had found on analogous
natural gas issue that "exit fees would stifle the development of a competitive industry
by forcing customers desiring to switch suppliers when their contracts expire to pay the
supply costs of both their new and former suppliers). When the Commission explained
its decision to use exit fees, it largely ignored efficiency concerns and instead shifted to
the different principle of "cost causation!--customers should pay the costs they allegedly
had created. The Texas PUC suggested that the Commission deal with the problem that
"direct assignment," though giving most protection for recovery, "could also significantly
impede the creation of a more competitive wholesale market by making it prohibitively
expensive for a utility customer to obtain a new supplier," by putting only part of the
costs on the exiting customer. Texas PUC Comments, supra note 87, at 5.
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Order No. 888 does. not explain why competition should be
delayed in electricity, but not in natural gas, until utilities recover their stake in assets whose inefficiency necessitated deregulation in the first place.
F. In Natural Gas, FERC Said That 'Reasonable Expectations"
of Serving Customers Were Irrelevant,But Not So In
Electricity
One last irreconcilable difference between electricity and
natural gas involves reasonable expectations of serving customers. Stranded cost recovery in electricity looks to the utilities'
"reasonable expectations" of continuing to serve the departing
customer, rather than to responsibility for acquiring uneconomic
assets. If that expectation is reasonable, the utility generally
will be able to bill the customer for whatever costs its departure
causes.
The problem with this mechanism is that it does not adjust
recovery when the reason the customer is leaving, and the reason a utility finds its investment stranded, is that the utility
bought the wrong sources of power. Most of these customers
would have been delighted to stay with their electric company
indefinitely, just as long as it offered the lowest-cost electricity.
In natural gas, the Commission rejected pipeline efforts to
be absolved of their gas-cost problem because they too had "reasonable expectations" of serving customers who suddenly wanted
to switch to other gas suppliers. It made pipelines share take-orpay losses even though take-or-pay contracts "may have been
entered into to meet the reasonably anticipated needs of the
pipeline's customers." 10
Naturally, one would expect utility trade groups to want to prolong their members'
control over their markets as long as possible, and so to endorse exit fees because these
are likeliest to deter customers from shifting to other suppliers. And guess what? See
EEI Comments, supra note 43, at 84 ("Direct assignment is preferable to a general
surcharge or general access fee because it would ensure that the customers for whom
the costs were incurred pay them); id. at 93 (listing direct assignment as 'first-beat"
solution).
Exit fees seem to contradict language in at least part of two prior adjudications,
Transwestern Pipeline Co., 44 F.E.R.C. § 61,164, at 61,536 (1988), and El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 47 F.E.R.C. § 61,108, at 61,314 (1989), but FERC has offered enough of a distinction of those orders in Order No. 888-A that it probably will pass muster. See generally Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at T 12,394-96. It would be a classic case of the tail
wagging the dog if those minor adjudications trumped the much more considered analysis (be it right or wrong) in the electricity open-access order.
109. See Order No. 528-A, 54 F.ER&C. Rpts. at 61,304.
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No. 636 CoNFmMs FERC's REJECTION

OF ITS

NATURAL GAS PRINCIPLES

Proof that FERC really has changed its approach to
stranded costs, rejecting the principles it crafted so laboriously
over years of natural gas litigation, comes from Order No. 636.
Here, in an order still about natural gas, the Commission has
given pipelines' latest stranded costs the same favorable treatment as electricity's stranded costs.
Like Order Nos. 380 and 436, Order No. 636 was driven by
FERC's conclusion that pipeline practices were continuing to
block the competitive gas market. Now the problem was that
pipelines were not unbundling their services, thus giving competitors in unbundled markets a hard time competing. Thirdparty sellers argued that their transportation was "not comparable to the transportation embedded in a pipeline's sales service,"
while local distribution companies argued that they could not
convert their rights from sales to transportation because the
new transportation "may not be as reliable as existing pipeline
bundled sales service during peak periods."110 Bundled service
was "operating, and will continue to operate, in a manner that
causes considerable competitive harm to all segments of the natural gas industry " ' FERC's remedy was to unbundle, or split
up, transportation from the other pipeline services and to make
pipelines offer equal transportation to open-access customers:
Simply put, efficiency in the now national gas market can be realized
only when the purchasers of a commodity know, in a timely manner, the
prices of the distinct elements associated with the full range of services
needed to purchase and then deliver gas from the wellhead to the
burnertip .... In brief, this rule requires pipelines to unbundle [i.e, separate] their sales service from their transportation services at an upstream point near the production area and to provide all transportation
services on a basis that is equal in quality for all gas supplies .... 12

This exposure of pipeline services to competition increases
their risk of underrecovery, as has almost every other step of
deregulation. But FERC's solution to these new gas costs makes
clear its stark deviation from Order No. 500 and equitable sharing. One would have expected a continuation of the Order Nos.
380, 436, and 500 precedent. As the source of uncompetitive
110. Order No. 636, 57 Fed. Reg. at 13,269.
111. Id. at 13,276 n.78.
112. Id. at 13,269-70.
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practices, pipelines would bear a heavy share of their stranded
costs. This did not happen.
Instead, in Order No. 636, FERC protected four kinds of
stranded113 costs. The first two involved gas costs: unrecovered
purchase adjustments and gas buy-down and buy-out costs attributable to the new rules. The last two were the cost of facilities made unnecessary by unbundling, and the cost of new facilities like meters and pipes required to unbundle.11 Pipelines will
not have to pay any of these costs. On the two gas-cost expenses, FERC agreed to let pipelines direct bill the charges,115
FERC also protected the stranded facilities and new facility expenses. With almost no discussion, it stated that stranded costs
from the breakup of bundled sales, and the transition costs of
new facilities, would be recoverable like any prudently incurred
6
costs.

11

The Commission did not explain why it was giving pipelines
a much more favorable treatment for their transportation/field
service unbundling than, say, for uncoupling the transportation/
merchant roles in Order No. 436. It did advance one excuse,
which was that these new costs may not amount to much. Order
No. 500's equitable sharing had been needed to "encourage pipelines to share some of the cost of the extraordinary take-or-pay
liabilities of the early and mid-1980s."1 7 In contrast, the Commission "does not anticipate that pipeline gas supply costs that
are incurred as a result of implementing this rule will approach
the order of magnitude of the take-or-pay liabilities of that
era.""8 As a small consolation for pipeline customers, the Commission noted that pipelines would not be shielded from
prudency review as they had been under Order No. 500's equitable sharing." 9
The District of Columbia Circuit reversed. It found one hundred percent billing for gas supply recovery costs, which arose
from the same kind of contracts as take-or-pay exposure, "a sub113. FERC only applied the term "stranded' to the third category of costs, physical
facilities made useless by the unbundling of transportation from other services. But in
the deeper sense that stranded is used in this Article, as obligations or losses caused by
deregulation compounded with market inefficiency, all four categories of costs are
"stranded" by Order No. 636.
114. See Order No. 636, 57 Fed. Reg. at 13,307.
115. Id at 13,307-08.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 13,308.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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stantial change" from Order No. 500.120 The court believed that
the rationale for Order No. 500's cost sharing "substantially applies" to Order No. 636 GSR costs.Y1 Understandably, it rejected
the argument that the Commission could pass through all GSR
costs because they were so small.122
The Commission now has issued Order No. 636-C, in which
it reiterates its determination to give pipelines full recovery for
post-636 stranded gas costs. Among its other achievements, Order No. 636-C tries to rewrite Order No. 500 radically. Now the
Commission says that the "opportunity to recover the full
amount of their prudently incurred costs" is the "bedrock
ratemaking principle."m In Order No. 500, of course, the "fundamental principle" was who was responsible for overpriced gas
contracts. Responsibility for costs, not responsibility for pipelines, was the key. In Order No. 500, FERC went out of its way
to reject the view that pipelines have a right to recover costs
that had turned out to be uneconomic, even if they had been
prudently incurred. 2
The Order No. 636-C Commission pretended that the real
25
rationale for equitable sharing is found in Order No. 528-A.1
There the Commission allegedly "did not rely" on cost sharing,
but instead honored the right to recover prudent costs. This revisionist story is that pipelines got stuck with their initial takeor-pay losses only because the losses were "caused more by gen120. United Distribution Cos. v. FERC, 88 E3d 1105, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The petitioners had put it stronger, noting 'the remarkable similarities between Order No. 636
GSR costs and Order No. 436 take-or-pay osts..... Id. at 1188.
121. The court also criticized FERC for awarding GSR costs on a value-of-service
basis, but not assigning any costs to pipelines even though the Commission had found
that pipelines too would benefit from the Order Id. The court sidestepped another major
stranded cost question, in dealing with the costs of facilities like capacity no longer
needed after Order No. 636: how those costs should be allocated. This issue was not
presented because the only challenge on appeal was whether pipelines should not recover
one hundred percent of these stranded costs in any fashion. See i&. at 1179. The court
noted that FERC had a range of options, from just treating these costs as a cost of service, to putting them in the ratebase with full interest recovery too. Id
122. Id. at 1189.
123. Order No. 636-C, 78 F.E.R.C. at 61,787.
124. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
125. See Order No. 636-C, 78 ER.C. at 61,784. This is a very straige theory because Order No. 528-A was not at all about the validity of equitable sharing, but only
about how to structure the Order No. 500 charge to avoid falling afoul of the filed rate
doctrine. FERC already had given the reasons for equitable sharing itself, those reasons
had been fought over, and FERC ultimately won. The idea that the Commission would
save its real thinking on equitable sharing for a supplemental order on filed rate details
might amuse admini trative lawyers, but it is not true.
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eral market conditions than by any regulatory action." 6 FERC
may intend to imply, by this language, that take-or-pay risks
could not meet ordinary prudency standards. Order No. 636-C
gamely claims that post-500 stranded gas costs, in contrast,
were produced entirely by regulatory action. Most first-round
take-or-pay costs had been resolved by the time of Order No.
636 (implying that the "market" problem had been settled).
Into this restored world strode the colossus of Order No. 636,
which "upset this relatively stable situation and created a new
jeopardy for the recovery of pipeline gas supply costs."28 This
"new jeopardy" resulted from several parts of Order No. 636, not
just its unbundling but also rules that made pipelines give up
storage capacity and that made downstream pipelines unbundle,
"resulting in the loss of the downstream pipelines as sales
customers.:1 9
No matter how hard FERC tries to reconcile Order Nos. 636
and 500, it will fail. It is not true that prudent recovery is the
"bedrock" principle of ratemaking, and equitable sharing a mistake to be forgotten. Instead, as the Commission acknowledged
in Order No. 528-A, prudency is only one of at least two independent requirements that apply to ratebase costs. Prudency
cannot be "the bedrock" principle when even prudent costs are
unrecoverable if assets are not used and useful. 130
And FERC decidedly did not say in Order No. 500 that it
was creating a special, one-time rule for take-or-pay costs because they were "caused more by general market conditions
than by any regulatory action."131 Both natural gas and electricity stranded costs exist because of two independent causes:
First, FERC removed rules that were helping regulated companies pass along even uneconomic costs. Second, the companies'
investing decisions were very uneconomic.
Pipelines got into trouble because regulatory changes combined with their market mistakes. Pipelines signed very bad gas
126. Id. at 61,785.
127. Id.

128. Id. at 61,786.
129. Id. The Commission distinguished Order No. 500 as well for being a new rule,
one that addressed a problem "[tihe Commission and the industry had never previously
faced. ...one raising "massive costs" and an "extraordinary nature.... . Id. at 61,784.
It is not clear why this is relevant. So Order No. 500 addressed a new problem. So
what? Is FERC saying that it now wishes it had not come up with equitable sharing,
that such an approach was an error it will not make again because it has had time for
reflection? If so, what part of the order was mistaken?
130. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
131. But see Order No. 636-C, 78 EE.R.C. at 61,785.
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supply contracts, but the take-or-pay problem only became an
"extraordinary" problem when these market errors were combined with government acts. Pipelines faced serious competition
because of the NGPA's deregulation of gas wellhead prices; of
Order No. 380's voiding of minimum bills; and of Order No.
436's requiring open access and letting customers trade firm
sales for firm transportation. No one involved in natural gas
deregulation could imagine seriously that pipelines' take-or-pay
exposure was only market caused.
Conversely, the Commission is just as wrong that the only
reason pipelines face Order No. 636 stranded costs is regulation.
If pipelines had developed competitive sales, field service, and
transportation services while regulated, they would be able to
recover their costs fully even after Order No. 636. Downstream
pipelines, for instance, would not leave because they still would
want to use the most economic upstream pipeline. The reason a
problem exists is exactly the same as for Order No. 500: the
Commission removed regulatory protection that shielded uneconomic costs, and some pipeline costs are in fact very uneconomic, so that they could not survive competition. It is this second cause that explains why Order No. 528-A criticized
pipelines for ignoring the principle that the Commission would
not guarantee pipelines "recovery of costs which market conditions would not otherwise permit," and that ratepayers should
only bear "the
legitimate costs," market-proven costs, of provid32
ing service.

IV. FERC HAS NOT FouND ANY PRNCIPLE THAT JusTmIEs
TREATING ELECTRc ComPAIqms BETIER THAN PIPELINES
Even a superficial look at the two energy deregulations indicates that the Commission has a problem justifying why it
gave electric utilities such special treatment, after it made natural gas pipelines pay for so much of their mistakes.
A.

The Recent Experiences of Gas and Electricity Are Similar,
Not Different

The Commission has given it the old college try in its effort
to distinguish natural gas from electricity. It argues that natural
gas experienced the "market failure" that did not strike electricity. A combination of shrinking demand for gas, the NGPA's
statutory price escalations, and increasing gas production alleg132. Order No. 528-A, 54 REI.C. at 61,303.
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edly caused a "market failure" that required extraordinary relief.1 The Commission did not believe these conditions existed
in electricity.
In language sure to infuriate pipelines, the Commission
claimed in Order No. 888 that another difference between the
two industries was that most natural gas contracts had been renegotiated by the time it acted on gas costs, so that "it was not
possible for the Commission to use a strict cost causation approach."1 4 The commodity wellhead market "was already competitive and the majority of gas was already being sold on an
unbundled basis."'m But having decided to give electric companies better treatment, FERC declared that "such a broad-based
approach to recovery of natural gas transition costs was an exception to the time-honored principle that rates should reflect
cost causation." 1 6 Making pipelines bear a share of stranded
costs was "an extraordinary measure given the nature of the
take-or-pay problem and the prevailing environment at that
time."137

FERC dug its heels in even more in Order No. 888-A, adamantly maintaining that gas really is different from electricity
and that there is no inconsistency between its open-access approach to the two industries. Once again the Commission
painted equitable sharing as an exception, justified only by the
of the natural gas market, to or"extraordinary" circumstances
138
dinary rate principles.
This effort to distinguish natural gas from electricity is riddled with implausibility. The portrayal of natural gas restructuring as an exception to the traditional principle of cost causation
is a brave assertion, because the natural gas orders did not suggest that the Commission was deviating from an ordinary standard. Had FERC said in Order No. 500 that it was an exception
to the treatment otherwise proper, just a little administrative
gamble or shot in the dark, it is almost certain, given the hostility with which the courts met all of the natural gas restructuring orders, that the Order would have been remanded again.
133. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,557.
134. See id. at 21,636 (this page also states FERC's view that, because of a 'long period of open access transition7 in gas, 'most of the former bundled customers of the pipeline had already departed the pipelines sales service before the Commission addressed
the recovery of take-or-pay costs in Order Nos. 500 and 528).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 21,636-37.
137. Id. at 21,637.
138. See Order No. 636-C, 78 FZE..C. at 61,784 (1997).
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The defense that pipelines should get less protection than
electric companies because time had brought the voluntary renegotiation of so many gas contracts is another argument that
FERC would not have dared use in Order No. 500. It was precisely such a fear that the Commission was dawdling on take-orpay until the problem went away that led the District of Columbia Circuit to remand Order No. 436.139 The Commission never
could have made the admission that it was doing just that and
survived judicial review.
The claim that pipelines had to bear gas costs because of an
"extraordinary" market failure is just as unpersuasive. To the
extent that the problem facing pipelines was the rise of a more
efficient market that, with open access, would swamp established companies, that problem is at least as severe in electricity as in natural gas. Just look at FERC's discussion of cost variations between large plants and the best new plants, or
estimates of $200 to $300 billion in stranded costs compared to
$500 or so billion in assets. 140
To the extent that "extraordinary" refers to the dollars involved, electricity's large problem should support a mechanism
that puts much of the financial burden on utilities. In Order No.
636, the Commission tried to harmonize the full recovery of that
Order's new gas supply costs with the equitable sharing of Order No. 500 by pointing to the "extraordinary" size of the earlier
take-or-pay costs. 141 So a large exposure justified spreading
stranded costs across the natural gas industry, including to
pipelines. Then, in Order No. 888, the Commission used the "extraordinary" magnitude of stranded costs, in this case electricity
costs, to reach the opposite lesson from Order No. 500. This
time the Commission, with its repeated concern that the costs
are so great that they could threaten utilities' financial viability,
has used size to require full pass-through.'4 In Order No. 500,
the large industry problem required equitable sharing; in Order
No. 888, large magnitude requires one hundred percent passthrough.
139. American Gas Association v. FERC, 888 F.2d 136, 147-48 (D.C. Ci. 1989).
140. In the opening pages of Order No. 888, the Commission cited data that average
costs for coal plants run from four to seven cents per kilowatt/hour, nuclear plants up to
fifteen cents, but new, state-of-the-art natural gas plants just three to five cents. Order
No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,544 & nn.29-30. For estimates on the size of stranded costs,
see supra note 45.
141. See supra note 93.
142. See supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
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One way to picture the problem with the new rule for electricity is to imagine that Order Nos. 888 and 500 had been issued on the same day. FERC would have had to admit that
while it was requiring equitable sharing in natural gas, this was
an exception to the cost-causation principle that it thinks should
apply generally, including to the electricity industry. FERC
would say, "We are going to rely on cost responsibility for incurring stranded costs in natural gas, but ignore that principle in
electricity and focus instead on the bargain utilities say is represented by their service commitment, their financial exposure,
and what we enjoy calling cost causation." The Commission
would have had to argue that it was giving pipelines this special
burden because contract renegotiation was so far along and admit, in turn, that this was because the Commission had
thwarted all pressures to address the take-or-pay problem
sooner. And it would have had to hold, inconsistently, that the
"extraordinary" magnitude of high gas costs required equitable
sharing in Order No. 500, that the smaller size of later gas transition costs warranted full recovery in Order No. 636, and that
the company-threatening size of the costs (i.e., the extraordinarily large costs) required full pass-through in electricity.
Pipelines would have been up in arms at their greater burden. Electricity consumers would have been up in arms at the
Commission's failure to enforce its insight from natural gas that
regulated firms should bear substantial responsibility for their
decisions.14
143. Given the fact that if the natural gas experience stands for anything, it must
be the proposition that regulated companies do bear responsibility for at least much of
their mistakes, a reality the District of Columbia circuit followed when it reversed Order
No. 636's treatment of stranded cost, it is a strange indeed to see utilities cite natural
gas precedent as if this is good precedent on the way to handle stranded costs. But see
Request for Clarification and Rehearing of Southern California Edison Company, at 34
(May 24, 1996) (citing Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir.
1987) for purported principle that "the Commission has an obligation to address
stranded costs" [ignoring the fact that equitable sharing was the result]); see also Santa
& Sikora, supra note 41, at 295 (claiming that in both industries, "the FERC has recognized that part of managing the regulatory transition to a more competitive environment
is providing a mechanism for natural gas pipelines and electric utilities to recover legitimate costs incurred to honor sales obligations under the old regime). These odd citations draw some support from the Commission's claim that its natural gas experience
taught it the need to deal with stranded costs as part of the transition. Order No. 888,
61 Fed. Reg. at 21,630; Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,373, 12,376-77. The oddity of
the references, of course, is that attentiveness should not be all that the Commission
learns from its natural gas experience. The electricity mechanism could not be more at
odds with FERC's approach and allocation of responsibility in natural gas. Administrative politics, like general politics, clearly breed strange bedfellows.
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B. Electric Utilities Might Deserve to Do Somewhat Better
Than Pipelines, But FERC Has Not Made That Case
The fact that FERC and state commissions only can reach a
fair allocation of stranded electric costs by deciding the responsibility that utilities bear for their mistakes, over-investments,
and discrimination, does not mean that the electric industry
would end up with the same proportionate burden as pipelines.
To the extent that FERC and state regulators played a larger
role by requiring utilities to sign QF contracts and in other electricity market distortions, electric companies could get more protection under a cost-responsibility standard. The Commission
thus far has avoided measuring the distortions due to company
mistakes, but there is no reason to expect that this balance
would be the same in electricity as in gas.
One big distinction between the two industries is the painful cure already doled out to electric utilities for unwanted nuclear plants. Nuclear plants provide a lot of the nation's electric
power-twenty-two percent by the early Nineties. 144 Utilities
wrote off something like $20 billion for these plants in the
Eighties. 145 To the extent that commissions already had adjudicated the blame that utilities should bear for these costs, the
residual costs presumably would be passed through to customers
in their entirety. At least many of these costs already should be
discounted for cost responsibility.
A second distortion more direct than in natural gas comes
from QF contracts. These contracts forced utilities to buy very
uneconomic power. Under the peculiar structure of PURPA,
states set avoided-cost standards under which utilities had to
purchase power that matched their own "avoided costs. 1 It is
fairly obvious today that "[m]any state PUCs and legislatures
greatly overestimated long-run avoided costs, thus forcing utilities to buy huge amounts of overpriced power.' 47 State commissions also overestimated the amount of power needed. 148 SoCal,
144. See EIA REPORT, supra note 42, at 13, Figure 12. Not only is nuclear power
second only to coal as a fuel for generating electricity, but what is striking is that the
amount of power produced from each of these sources has increased dramatically since
1970. See id. Nuclear power, for instance, provided only 1.4% of the country's electricity

in 1970. Id- at 12.
145. FERC counted $22.4 billion in disallowed nuclear costs between 1985 and
1992. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,544 & n.19. The EEI puts the number for the
Eighties at $16 billion. EEI Comments, supra note 43, at 12.
146. See supra note 42.

147. Black & Pierce, supra note 43, at 1347.
148. The administration of qualifying facilities distorted the amount as well as cost
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one of the country's largest utilities, has claimed that QF contracts will be its largest source of stranded costs, with its abovemarket QF payments having a net present value of about $5 billion.149 The Edison Electric Institute (EEI) estimates the net
present value of QF contracts at $38 billion nationally.150 Another recent study projects the losses at $42 billion, on top of an
even greater $53 billion in high-cost power contracts with other
utilities.151 In many states, the level of government involvement
contracts is higher than in the ordinary take-or-pay
in these 52
contract.
Congress made another unusually bad decision in the
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act,153 which included provisions to protect what seemed to be dwindling natural gas
reserves. One provision forbid utilities from building new gasfired power plants. This was an unfortunate interference, coming at a time when many state commissions were urging nuclear-plant investment. It has turned out that nuclear power is
far and away our most expensive power source, even without adding a discounted present cost for still-unsolved waste disposal
and storage problems; meanwhile, gas-fired plants are the
cheapest form of generation.1M
Another large group of costs come from "regulatory assets,"
which can include everything from approved storm property
losses to deferred fuel charges. The EErs figure for these costs
of power. "In some States, the avoided cost pricing formulas forced utilities to pay for QF
capacity that they did not need because the supply and demand balance for electricity
was not considered in avoided cost EIA RFPoRT, supra note 42, at 24. Another problem
is that this pricing structure gave potential QF producers every incentive to push the
administrative process for an unrealistically high avoided cost, but then removed any incentive for the supplier to become more efficient. "[Tihe price for wholesale electricity
from QFs, still the vast majority of non-utilities, bears no relationship to the production
costs of the selling company." Id. at 30. (Later QF contracts began to use marketsensitive terms, after this problem became apparent).
149. Comments of Southern California Edison Company, at 6 (Dec. 9, 1994). SoCal
insists that "[tihese QF contracts are the direct result of legislative and regulatory mandates" Id at 11-3.
150. EEI Comments, supra note 43, at 20. Not surprisingly, EEI does not feel that
its members should bear these costs. In the Institute's phrasing, the costs arose because
"states often required utilities to purchase power at rates far in excess of actual avoided
costs or when additional generation resources were simply not needed." Id. at 19.
151. RDI Release, supra note 45, at 1. Worse, one of the study's "key finding[s]" was
that "over [sixty percent] of the contracts do not expire until after the year 2010." Id. at
2.
152. For a contrary view, see supra note 17.
153. Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat.
3289 (codified in scattered sections of titles 14, 42, 45 and 49 of US.C.).
154. See supra note 140.
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is at least $75 billion.155 Though companies have every incentive
to inflate their regulatory-asset account with ordinary business
expenses, 156 these costs include a number of legitimate but deferred costs whose recovery already has been guaranteed by
commissions. Many5 7 demand-side management expenses may fall
into this category.
It is not possible to know how far utilities really should be
held responsible for their stranded costs because FERC has not
developed the record needed to make this determination. But it
is unwise to take the regulatory victim argument at face value.
It turns out, for instance, that half of SoCal's QF purchases
were made from Mission Energy, a wholly owned affiliate. 158 In
another category of stranded costs, Bernard Black and Richard
Pierce claim that utilities exploited demand management programs once they realized that these programs offered a way to
inflate their ratebase. 1 Thus even costs that look as if they
were foisted on utilities by regulators deserve a closer look
before anyone decides how far they should be recovered.
Even though a test of cost responsibility might let electric
companies recover a higher percentage of their stranded costs
than pipelines, this does not mean that Order No. 888's full recovery represents a prudential decision to avoid the difficult and
costly question of how much. There is no sign that the Commission was making a prudent, if implicit, judgment that the benefits of making electric companies bear some of their losses would
be outweighed by the costs of litigating the right allocation. One
problem with such a theory is that FERC did not develop any
record at all on the stranded costs that it blames on electric
155. EEI Comments, supra note 43, at 23. For the Institute's listing of the categories that fit into this group, see id. at 24-25. In its 1997 stranded cost report, RDI came
up with $49 billion. RDI Release, supra note 45, at 2.
156. All one needs to do is take a run through EEls list of regulatory assets to realize how difficult it will be to figure out which of these costs truly were "stranded" by regulation. The organization lists 'Extraordinary Property Losses," "Unrecovered Plant and
Regulatory Study Costs," "Deferred SFAS No. 109 Costs," "DOE Decommissioning Assessment," "Deferred Fuel Costs," 'Deferred DSM Costs," "Deferred Pension, Other Post
Employee Benefits (OPEBs) and Early Retirement Costs," 'Environmental and Storm
Damage Costs," "Deferred Contract Buyout Costs," "Phase-in, Synchronization and
Other," "Deferred Losses from Disposition of Utility Plant," "Research, Development and
Demonstration Expenditures," "Unamortized Loss on Reacquired Debt," and 'Unrecovered Purchase Gas Costs." EEI Comments, supra note 43, at 24-25. Readers will get the
strong impression that they have not seen the end of the list.
157. The EEI claims that utilities "have spent an estimated $12 billion in DSM programs alone from 1985 to 1993." I at 22.
158. YELLOW REPORT, supra note 79, at 80.
159. Black & Pierce, supra note 43, at 1357.
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companies. Nor did it project the cost of litigation. So there was
no basis for guessing how these factors balance each other.
Moreover, a decision that utilities are to blame for only an
insignificant share of stranded costs is inconsistent with the justification for deregulating. If that is so, then these companies,
with all the benefits of their large scale, established networks,
and deep experience, might as well remain our electric suppliers. We have deregulated because FERC does not believe that
electric companies have been efficient. They have made too
many mistakes. That is why their markets have been opened
up.
If costs are stranded from utility mistakes, subsidizing
those mistakes by passing the costs along to departing customers, to all customers, or to competing generators through an added transmission surcharge has efficiency costs. Such indulgence
rewards the inefficient and delays, perhaps in some cases prevents, the shift of demand to better run companies. This subsidy
has unwarranted wealth-transfer effects as well as efficiency
problems.
Finally, careless, unjustified pass-through, a pass-through
inconsistent with the stated rationales for deregulating, undermines (and should undermine) the legitimacy of the regulatory
process. Every government decision can add to or subtract from
the assent upon which agency action relies for implementation.
Major decisions that come into the public eye generally have a
disproportionate effect on beliefs about agencies. Agencies have
to fight for legitimacy by making the fairness of their orders
transparent to the larger society upon which those orders will
be imposed. A stranded cost rule so at odds with the theory of
deregulation can only damage the Commission's support.
CONCLUSION

The fact that FERC has not been consistent as it moved
from natural gas to electricity does not mean automatically that
Order No. 888 is wrong. Consistency is not a god to be pursued
slavishly.160 The natural gas rules might be ill-founded, or there
160. A system that would not let agencies change their rules as they learn new
facts, or become aware of the fallacy of an old rule, would be no more just than a judicial system that had to use precedent as its only guide. Indeed, because agencies are
supposed to deal with complex matters that are beyond the expertise of the average
judge and may require more narrow expertise-and because regulators often are chosen
more for their specific knowledge than for their neutrality-agencies particularly should
be allowed to change their rules, if they have a good reason for reversing course:
The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation of
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might be some other distinction between the two industries. Or
something fundamental might have changed in the economy between the late Eighties and today, in a way that justifies different treatment of electric companies.
Nonetheless, such a marked difference in approach, with
outcomes so contradictory, justifies at least the presumption
that something is wrong with Order No. 888. And in fact, there
is no obviously relevant difference between deregulation in natural gas and in electricity, in spite of FERC's claims in Order
Nos. 888, 888-A, and 636-C. And there is no large economic
change under way across the country that seems to justify the
differences.
The worst problem is that full recovery is so at odds with
the goals of deregulation, which should reflect the Commission's
first and most deep-seated duty, its duty to serve consumers.
The Commission's obeisance to alleged utility reliance and financial integrity and its allegiance to "cost causation" reject the
insight of deregulation. As FERC understood in natural gas but
has forgotten in electricity, the rationale for opening industries
to the market is the inefficiency of regulated decisionmaking. Industries are exposed to competition because the core duty of
agencies in American economic regulation is to protect consumer
welfare, not to shield careless utility investment. Unbundling
and open access do not deny regulated companies their right to
recovery. They merely make those companies prove that their
investments were efficient. If not, the loss is supposed to fall on
the investing company.
Making regulated companies bear the risk of bad investments performs several functions. It ensures that they have
every incentive to operate at maximal efficiency. It clears the
way for new entrants to appear and force competition into the
industry. And it guarantees that consumers will get the benefits
of lower prices that competition can bring. Cost-based recovery
would not have to saddle utilities with mistakes that regulators
foisted on them, but it would make a fair effort at distinguishing that impairment from mistakes that should be lodged with
utility decisionmaking.
the term "source" does not, as respondents argue, lead us to conclude that no
deference should be accorded the agency's interpretation of the statute. An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the
agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.
Chevron U.SA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defence Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64

(1983).
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In contrast, the decision to protect stranded plants and supply contracts of electric utilities, even when the inefficiency of
these investments and discrimination in shielding them from
market forces has risen to a level that requires
deregulation, is
161
inconsistent with the decision to deregulate.

161. If the reliance argument is carried to the extreme that allows full stranded
cost recovery, it undermines the purpose of deregulation. If the only reason utilities operated inefficiently lies in regulations like QF requirements, then FERC could have reinvigorated the market simply by rewriting the offending regulations. The many steps
taken to encourage new companies to enter the generating market make little sense if
regulators assume that utilities have been doing a good job.
Another response to this criticism of Order No. 888, a response that FERC lawyers
frequently raise, is that politics explains Order No. 888 and it is myopic to expect the
Commission, or any agency, to act in any other way. See, ag., MURRAY EDELMAN, THE
SYMBOLIC USES OF POLmCS 56 (1985) (agencies "as economic and political instruments of
the parties they regulate and benefit, not of a reified 'society,' 'general will,' or 'public interest'e"); KALT Er AL., supra note 36, at 21 ("Regulatory decisions are intrinsically political'). This material-interest view of politics has an intriguing provenance. It is an accurate reflection of the Marxist reading of history, in which political systems reflect the
substructure set by ownership of the means of production, but ironically, a similarly reductionist approach has been picked up on the right end of the spectrum (an ironic contrast that is not surprising, given how much primacy both sides give to economic motivations and explanations), by Chicago School capture theorists who expect strongly held
preferences with resources to capture the administrative process. For lead articles, see
George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Scl. 3
(1971); Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L & ECON. 211 (1976).
One reason to shift decisions from the political branches to an agency supposedly
was to create a decisionmaking environment that could focus on scientific, technocratic
reasons. See generally JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMuISrATIvE PROCESS (1938) (the classic ar-

gument for agency expertise by one of the creators of the New Deal administrative infrastructure). We do not let commissioners collect campaign contributions, we do not let
their constituents vote on their election, and commissioners are not free to enact their
personal preferences as policy. These things may happen, but courts and judicial review
exist to screen out such decisions. Instead, FERC is supposed to serve its statutory purposes, while developing the best factual basis to decide how those purposes can be implemented. The actual outcomes, its rules and orders, may represent an uneasy truce between statutory commands and the quasi-political environment of agency
decisionmaking, but appeals to consistency, substantial evidence, and other legal constraints should help keep FERC in the right corral.

